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ESSAY
A PRIMER* ON DECONSTRUCTION'S**
"RHAPSODY OF WORD-PLAYS"***
ARTHUR AUSTIN****
Deconstruction, a method of literary criticism unleashed by
Jacques Derrida, has burst into legal academia. The critical
legal studies and feminist jurisprudence movements, among
others, have used its manipulative techniques to undermine
traditional interpretations of law and society. Deconstruction
has also made appearances among practitioners and in judges'
chambers. In his Essay, Professor Arthur Austin defines this
ephemeral theory of meaning and introduces the reader to the
key decon players. He then illustrates, both textually and
graphically, how deconstruction has been applied to legal analy-
sis. Professor Austin concludes that, although deconstruction
may be the ultimate word game, it has no relevance to law. Fi-
nally, in a fit of "aporia, " the author deconstructs himself
I. "To READ IS TO DESIRE THE WORK, TO WANT TO BE
THE WORK .... 9,1
Deconstruction is more than a buzzword.2 Its impact exceeds the
* "The purpose of this typographical maneuver ... is to indicate that the cancelled
words, though inadequate, are the only ones available to the writer. It's a flashy gesture, and it
makes an interesting point, though it can quickly become an annoying affection." DAVID
LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TIMES 53 (1991).
** "Deconstruction" is a second choice word. Derrida has confessed on several
occasions that he has been somewhat surprised by the way this word came to be
singled out, since he had initially proposed it in a chain with other words-for
example, difference, spacing, trace-none of which can command the series or
function as a master word.
Peggy Kamuf, Introduction to JACQUES DERRIDA, A DERRIDA READER: BETWEEN THE
BLINDS vii (Peggy Kamuf ed., 1991).
*** Stephen Cox, Devices of Deconstruction, 3 CRITICAL REV. 56, 66 (1989).
**** Edgar A. Hahn Professor of Jurisprudence, Case Western Reserve University School
of Law. Heidi Emick and Patricia Chambers made important contributions to this paper.
1. ROLAND BARTHES, CRITICIsM AND TRUTH 93 (Katrine P. Keuneman ed. & trans.,
1987).
2. "[I]mportant-sounding word or phrase connected with a specialized field that is used
primarily to impress [laypersons]." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 222 (2d College
ed. 1982).
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yuppie dedication to "greed." 3 Decon beats paradigm4 and oxymoron s
with an eclecticism that other buzzi lack.' This accounts for its suc-
cess-it can be used in any context because no one knows what it means.'
"Deconstruction is at once the most skeptical of critical methods and the
one least well understood by lawyers .... "8
Deconstruction is not an ephemera9 To be "livelier,"' 1 Harvard,"
Yale,12 and Stanford13 law reviews publish deconstruction articles.
While others profess to understand decon, a growing number of law
professors mistakenly think that they practice it.'4 A state supreme
court judge advertised for clerks who could apply "deconstructionist tex-
tual theory to workers compensation statutes and article 9 of the
U.C.C."15 Partners use it to stay ahead of wily associates who may at-
tempt to sneak it in conversation to make brownie points.1 6 There is,
3. "Greed is healthy. You can be greedy and still feel good about yourself," A quote
attributed to Ivan Boesky, a Wall Street takeover expert caught and sentenced for using inside
information. Arthur D. Austin, Antitrust Reaction to the Merger Wave." The Revolution v. the
Counterrevolution, 66 N.C. L. REv. 931, 941 (1988).
4. Paradigm is the boilerplate reference to THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCI-
ENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). "Like a virus, the word spread far beyond science and came to
mean basically any dominant idea." The History of an Unlikely Buzzword, FORTUNE, Sept. 23,
1991, at 140. A policy planner from the White House is dazzled: Kuhn's book is "in fact the
single most cogent description ever written about the sociological nature of intellectual
change." James P. Pinkerton, Book Review, AMERICAN SPECTATOR, Dec. 1991, at 12, 15.
5. See John W. Guendelsberger, The Charge of the Oxymora, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 24, 1989,
at 13.
6. It has even been called an "ominous buzzword." Nina King, Classroom Notes; A
Controversial English Department Deserves High Marks for Teaching, WASH. POST, April 7,
1991, at R12.
7. An ordinary political article on David Duke becomes more titillating with the title:
"Deconstructing Duke." Joe Klein, Deconstructing Duke, NEW YORK, Dec. 2, 1991, at 62.
8. RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 211
(1988).
9. See Benjamin Franklin, The Ephemera, in POOR RICHARD'S ALMANAC, AND OTHER
PAPERS 57 (1886). For a deconstruction of this sentence, see infra note 267.
10. Fox Butterfield, Kenyan's Son Named to Head Harvard Law Review, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 1990, at A17.
11. E.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983).
12. Eg., Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J.
997 (1985).
13. A Stanford Law Review symposium on critical legal studies, conducted by some of
the foremost law practitioners of deconstruction, verified that deconstruction was henceforth
part of the dialogue in legal education. See Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Con-
stitutional Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1984).
14. See infra notes 328-32 and accompanying text.
15. David Margolick, At The Bar, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1991, at A12.
16. In today's tight job market, brownie points are important.
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however, one problem: Applied to law, deconstruction is mischievous
nonsense.
Law decon is a fugitive from literary criticism."i The positive side
of literary criticism is reflected in the writing of talents like Matthew
Arnold,18 Edmund Wilson, 19 and George Bernard Shaw,2" who elevated
the reader's vision of literature. The critic's mission and responsibility is
to help the "literate public of his day"21 and identify merit.22 The down-
side is the vicissitudes of academe, which is a maelstrom of Boston style
politics and fashion-mostly the latter.23 The urge to be chic often over-
comes truth and candor. As a result, many literary types are takers-
that is their profession.24
Until recently the text was the source of the critic's message. The
critic could be imaginative, vacuous, or political, but no one disputed the
author's primary control over the text. The result was a unique disci-
pline in which the critics were always second to the text and the author.
No matter how innovative, they had to defer to the "creators." 25 Incapa-
ble of creating as authors, they were compelled to seek fame as "critics,"
intellectual parasites who feed off the work of others.
Successful critics attained fame by creating or attaching themselves
to "schools." A school is a disciplined perspective set up to guide one in
evaluating text. Realism, Humanism, Aestheticism, and Regionalism
17. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
18. "In his social criticism Arnold stakes everything upon culture; if we would save soci-
ety in a day of crumbling standards, we must find the best that men have thought and known
and make it prevail." THE COLLEGE SURVEY OF ENGLISH LrrERATURE 1054 (Alexander M.
Witherspoon ed., rev. ed. 1951).
19. "One of his complaints about academicians, indeed, was that they were too lazy to
read much, and hence elevated the reputations of unprolific writers.. . ." John Updike, Ed-
mund Wilson and the Landscape of Literature, ESQUIRE, Dec. 1983, at 428.
20. See GEORGE B. SHAW, DRAMATIC CrIICISM (John F. Matthews ed., 1959). It was
Shaw who said, perhaps anticipating deconstruction, that once "a revolution becomes a gov-
ernment it necessarily sets to work to exterminate the revolutionist.... For when the revolu-
tion triumphs revolution becomes counter-revolution." Claude Rawson, Playwright Pleasant
and Unpleasant, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1991, § 7 (Magazine), at 3 (book review).
21. T.S. ELIOT, To CRITICIZE THE CRITIC, AND OTHER WRITINGS 21 (1978).
22. "The job of the critic was not to act as judge or executioner over single works, but to
be a missionary and elucidator whose voice was heard over the whole country." Michael
Holroyd, George Bernard Shaw, Cub Reviewer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1988, § 7 (Magazine), at
1, 38.
23. The best description-a virtual training manual-is MARY MCCARTHY, THE
GROVES OF ACADEME (1951).
24. "He is in it for what he can get out of it, not for the satisfaction of getting something
right." RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (ESSAYS: 1972-1980) 152 (1982).
25. The closest that a critic can come to author status is to claim an aesthetic style. See
Ren6 Wellek, Destroying Literary Studies, NEw CRITERION, Dec. 1983, at 1, 3.
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have battled at one time or another for control of literary criticism.26
Deconstruction is a school that reverses the hierarchy of author over
critic.27 "[D]econstruction elevates the interpreter or critic above the lit-
erary or philosophical figure that he studies. His (or her) Shakespeare
has nothing to learn from Shakespeare himself. The thrill of being
Shakespeare's superior is not to be understated."28
A. Meaning and Deconstruction
Literary critics deal with the relationship between speech, text, nu-
ance, and meaning. Do words label things that exist independently of
language? Is a rose a rose plant whatever the language? It is, of course,
never this simple; a rose can be a plant (of many varieties), a name of
everything from a football player," or a woman, to a cow, 30 or color.
One way of dealing with this dilemma is to look for meaning in
"differentiations"-language serves to simplify meaning by differentiat-
ing categories. We refer to the words cold, warm, hot, and scalding to
describe the temperature of water. While an arbitrary point on the spec-
trum, warm serves to differentiate-or contrast-its category from cold
or hot. The meaning of warm is not totally arbitrary since the commu-
nity can contrast it with the other categories. The letters w-a-r-m com-
pose a "signifier" 31 which evokes the "signified" "warm" in the reader's
mind. It is, therefore, the differences that determine meaning.32 The
26. LITERARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY 1358-73 (Robert E. Spiller
et al. eds., 4th ed. 1974); see DONALD W. HEINEY, ESSENTIALS OF CONTEMPORARY LITERA-
TURE (1954).
27. For understandable discussions of deconstruction, see JOHN ELLIS, AGAINST DECON-
STRUCTION (1989); DAVID LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TIMES (1991); FRANK LENTRICCHIA,
AFTER THE NEW CRITICISM (1980); Raymond Tallis, A Cure For Theorrhea, 3 CRITICAL
REv. 7 (1989).
28. Joel Schwartz, Antihumanism in the Humanities, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1990, at 29,
42-43.
29. Earl Campbell was known as the "Tyler Rose" because of his family's 100 acre rose
farm. Class of '91, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, July 21, 1991, at I l-D.
30. Rose second of Aberlone was a cow sold as barren who subsequently had a calf. Sher-
wood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 569-71, 33 N.W. 919, 920 (1887).
31. A signifier is "the concretely perceptible component of a *sign, as distinct from its
conceptual meaning (the *signified). In language, this may be a meaningful sound, or a written
mark such as a letter or sequence of letters making up a word. The term often appears in its
French form, significant." CHRIS BALDICK, THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LITER-
ARY TERMS 205 (1990).
32. It is the system of differentiation, therefore, that is the source of meaning: the
way in which a language simplifies an infinitely complex set of phenomena to make
up a finite set of categories, to one or other of which all phenomena will be assigned,
What then becomes important is the particular set of characteristics that are the basis
of the differentiation introduced by the set of concepts.
ELLIS, supra note 27, at 46.
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reader and the language work together to discover meaning.
I describe this approach because it flushes out the complexities of
interpretation methodology and because it constitutes an effective
way to describe deconstruction.33 It is "structuralism," a method of
interpretation that proceeded "post-structuralism,"34 commonly called
deconstruction.
Deconstruction exploits differentiation in order to claim that mean-
ing is never ending. Its practitioners have replaced differentiation, or
contrasts between words, with the "play" of differences-"the free play
of the signifier" 35-which precludes a finite meaning. Meaning is con-
stantly deferred-postponed indefinitely-and thus is never fixed or "fi-
nal."36 There is suspension through trace; each word has trace of
meaning from previous words, while simultaneously "hold[ing] itself
open" to the traces of subsequent words.37 It joins the "inside" of the
text to the "outside."3 It is similar to the flight of an arrow; it is in
33. It is Saussure's technique and serves as the basis for the departure into deconstruction.
Id. at 45.
Saussure's insights marked a decisive and apparently irreversible shift in the science
of linguistics from an "item centered" to a system-centered view of language and
inaugurated a linguistics that was concerned less with the relations between individ-
ual words and their seemingly autonomous referents than with the systematic rela-
tions between words and other words.
Tallis, supra note 27, at 10. See generally DAVID HOLDCROFr, SAUSSURE: SIGNS, SYSTEM
AND ARBrIRARINmss (1991) (describing Saussure's theory in depth).
34. "Structuralists are convinced that systematic knowledge is possible; post-structuralists
claim to know only the impossibility of this knowledge." JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECON-
STRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM 22 (1982).
35. Tallis, supra note 27, at 34.
36. In Derrida's brand of differential linguistics, the meaning of words is never pres-
ent but is constantly deferred, since words differ not only from one another but from
themselves. How do words differ from themselves? Part of the explanation is that
there is an element of temporality in language, and therefore a word means some-
thing different each time it is used.. .. "
LEHMAN, supra note 27, at 95. "The sense we have of a presence how deferred and waiting to
be reappropriated is but an illusion created by the very process of linguistic deferral, an illusion
continuously undercut by the cunning movement of signification as the structure of differ-
ance." LENTRICCHIA, supra note 27, at 171.
37. TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 128 (1983).
38. EVE TAVOR BANNET, STRUCTURALISM AND THE LOGIC OF DISSENT 212 (1989).
It joins the word or meaning which is "present" in the text to words, meanings and
associations which are "absent" in the text but implied by the word's chain of as-
sociations or differential relations. Of course, the precondition for this operation is to
erase such concepts as authorial intention, linguistic intentionality and the difference
between conscious and unconscious intentions. Cleverly used, a word in one literary
or philosophical text can lead not only to any number of other literary or philosophi-
cal texts, but almost anywhere, in a system of "infinite reference of one to another."
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motion but at any instant it is not, and "every instant is already marked
with the traces of the past and future."39 As the deconstructionists say, a
text never has a "privileged" meaning. 4°
Some deconers prefer to explain the process as a function of "itera-
tion." The meaning of every word will change, however slightly, as it is
used in each new context and since "all texts are necessarily constructed
through iteration (that is, through the incremental repetition of words in
slightly displaced contexts), indeterminacy inheres in writing's very es-
sence."41 According to Derrida, "the enterprise of deconstruction al-
ways in a certain way falls prey to its own work."'42
The next step seals the demise of the author's influence and simulta-
neously assures that the reader-and the underprivileged critic-gain to-
tal control over the text. The operative term is "textuality." Texts do
not depend on the author's intention; instead they have a textuality, or
meaning, of their own. "All literary texts are woven out of other literary
texts, not in the conventional sense that they bear the traces of 'influence'
but in the more radical sense that every word, phrase or segment is a
reworking of other writings which precede or surround the individual
work."'43 Once the connection with the creator-author is severed, an ex-
tremely radical implication is accepted by the deconstructionists: The
text is no longer bound by any convention or rule of language, such as
the differentiation or contrast principle.' "There is nothing outside of
text [there is no outside-text; il n'y a pas de hors texte]."45 "[T]he read-
ers have now overthrown the bosses and installed themselves in
power."' For Barthes, it meant that "'it is the language which speaks,
not the author.' "c' It is a replay of Orwell's Animal Farm in inter-
39. CULLER, supra note 34, at 94.
40. "A deconstruction, then, shows the text resolutely refusing to offer any privileged
reading .... [D]econstructive criticism clearly transgresses the limits established by tradi-
tional criticism." ELLIs, supra note 27, at 69.
41. N. KATHERINE HAYLES, CHAOS BOUND: ORDERLY DISORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
LITERATURE AND SCIENCE 181 (1990).
42. JACQUES DERRIDA, Of Grammatology, in A DERRIDA READER: BETWEEN THE
BLINDS 41 (Peggy Kamuf ed., 1991).
43. EAGLETON, supra note 37, at 138. He adds: "There is no such thing as literary 'origi-
nality', no such thing as the 'first' literary work: [A]ll literature is 'intertextual.'" Id.
44. "'[I]ntertextuality' does not indicate merely the strategy of reading one text with an-
other, but the fact that every text is itself already an intertextual event ... the text is not
itself-because the present is not itself." LENTRICCHIA, supra note 27, at 175 (quoting John
Rowe).
45. Tallis, supra note 27, at 12 (quoting JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158
(Gayatri C. Spivak trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1976) (1967)).
46. EAGLETON, supra note 37, at 85.
47. Tallis, supra note 27, at 19 (quoting Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in
IMAGE-MUSic-TExT 142, 143 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977)).
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pretation.48
The consequence is an exercise in co-opting the author and text.
Under the Animal Farm regime: (1) The reader-critics are now in full
control of the meaning and the text. They, not the "oppressor" 9 au-
thors, are the creators."0 (2) There are as many "correct" interpretations
as readers.51 (3) Disputes over conflicting meanings can never be re-
solved because resolution would require appeal to the text-the focus of
the dispute. (4) Finally, if there is a "correct" interpretation, it belongs
to the deconstructionists.
These alterations are expressed in the deconstructionists' favorite
terror-word-"indeterminacy." "The tactic of deconstructive criticism
... is to show how texts come to embarrass their own ruling systems of
logic .... ."I' The term is aporia-meaning "full of doubts and objec-
tions."'5 3 Meaning is always indeterminate. Every word is vulnerable to
decon strategy. For example, in the title, "Deconstruction and the Possi-
bility of Justice," "the conjunction 'and' brings together words, concepts,
perhaps things that don't belong to the same category... and dares to
defy order, taxonomy, classificatory logic, no matter how it works: by
analogy, distinction or opposition.' 5 4 In other words, "[t]he deconstruc-
tive analysis of a literary work nearly always ends in a moment of termi-
nal uncertainty"-an aporia.5 5
An exercise in deconstruction is a "performance." The reader iden-
tifies a "privileged" interpretation of a text. The essence of the decon
performance is an attack on privileged meaning. "Privileged meaning" is
a political term of art that serves as a symbol for establishment views.
The process of performance is what the deconstructionists like to call
48. "'All Animals are Equal but Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others.'"
GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 123 (New American Library, 8th ed. 1962) (1946)).
49. "[fln a relentlessly political environment, the author is easily demonized as the op-
pressor in the author/critic relationship, demanding a subservience from which the academic
critic is determined to be liberated." Norman Fruman, Book Review, ACAD. QuEsTIoNS, Fall
1991, at 91, 95 (reviewing ALviN B. KERNAN, THE DEATH OF LrrERATURE (1990)).
50. "Sometimes the reader is said to discover the text's range of meanings, sometimes
actually to produce and create meanings, but common to all versions of this point is the asser-
tion that the critic is far more important and creative than criticism has assumed him to be."
ELLIS, supra note 27, at 115.
51. "There are no truths, only rival interpretations.... ." LEHMAN, supra note 27, at 67.
52. EAGLETON, supra note 37, at 133.
53. From the Greek meaning "unpassable path." CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, DECONSTRUC-
TION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 49 (1987).
54. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," 11 CAR-
Dozo L. Rnv. 919, 921 (1990).
55. LEHMAN, supra note 27, at 55.
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"critical terrorism."56
The performance is "undermining, subverting, exposing, undoing,
transgressing, or demystifying" s the privileged meaning. This is done
by suggesting a counter or polar interpretation, thereby demonstrating
indeterminacy which casts doubt on the legitimacy of the privileged read-
ing. Polar readings-"repressed writing" 5 ---are flushed out in the
"margins"-such as minor passages, historical references, footnotes-or
surmises. The deconstructionist can thus argue that his reading 5 -the
polar meaning-is just as correct as any other meaning.
Deconstructionists created a new universe of words such as
foregrounding, privilege, problematize, valorize, and contextualize.6°
These ambiguous terms allow them to speak in a language known only to
the insiders. The objective-in fact a "duty" 6 1-is to create a verbal
fashion that deflects critical attack and retains the author's ma
profonditd'.2 With "new and strange terminology... familiar positions
may not seem so familiar and otherwise obviously relevant scholarship
may not seem so obviously relevant."63 Who, for example, can under-
stand, much less criticize this: "We see in this rehearsal of Foucault that
contemporary criticism cherishes the displacement both of dialectics by
diacritics and of totalized organic representations of history by compre-
hensive graphs of affiliated disciplines in the episteme." 6
The purists-the defenders of the French vision-disagree with the
above survey. To them, it is low-life academic skulduggery that subverts
the method and purpose of deconstruction. "Domesticated and neutral-
56. Critical terrorists.., would like to blow up-metaphorically, of course-the
legitimacy of institutions and traditions, canons of taste and judgment, and received
values of any kind. And like terrorists, deconstructionists steel themselves to toss
their bombs without regard for the comfort of bystanders-in this case, the authors
and readers of literature.
Iad at 77.
57. ELLIS, supra note 27, at 69.
58. "A repressed writing ... is the 'tension between gesture and statement' in such critical
texts which 'liberates the future of a general grammatology.'" NORRIS, supra note 53, at 31.
59. The use of "his reading" is obviously a privileged phrase-and therefore the "oppres-
sive"-manifestation of patriarchy. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
60. For a full listing of words and definitions, see LEHMAN, supra note 27, at 84.
61. A duty "to avoid transparent language." Tallis, supra note 27, at 29.
62. A book by a French historian famous for his profound obscurity was recently
translated into plain English. When thus made clear it turned out that his argument
was simple, even a little simple-minded. The historian in his eminence was outraged
by the lucidity of the translation. It did not capture, he complained, ma profonditd.
DONALD N. McCLOSKEY, IF YOU'RE So SMART: THE NARRATIVE OF ECONOMIC EXPER-
TISE 57 (1990).
63. ELLIS, supra note 27, at 142.
64. LEHMAN, supra note 27, at 86.
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ized, it has been reduced to a tamed dogma of textual nihilism."6 The
purists make an important distinction.
To the finical, deconstruction is a can opener to the arrangement of
the text; it is a process of extracting terms that uncover the meaning of
the structure. Decon is a frustrating process-one may find an aesthetic
reading, but then must feed "this position back into the text, asking what
the work has to say about the conclusion reached."66 It is a "dogged
pursuit" to find "some final response to all linguistic and conceptual diffi-
culties."6 It is not, as the Americans presume, "free-play in the blue."68
The point of the purists is that deconstruction seeks exchanges, friction,
not interpretation. The "goal is not to reveal the meaning of a particular
work but to explore forces and structure that recur in reading and writ-
ing."6 9 It seeks textual knowledge.
B. The Players
To keep up with Edie,7 ° poseurs have to know the players.7 It is
not unusual for an agile dilettante to massage a night's conversation by
references to the decon stars. Any conversation has to include the fol-
lowing players: Jacques Derrida, Paul deMan, and Stanley Fish.
Jacques Derrida started it: "Deconstruction is the brainchild of Jac-
ques Derrida, the Algerian-born French philosopher, a resident of Paris
and a frequent visitor to the United States, where he has held faculty
appointments at several universities."72 On the lecture circuit, he is as
"hot" as Bruce Springsteen.73 His passion is the text, and he first gained
65. Allan C. Hutchinson, From Cultural Construction to Historical Deconstruction, 94
YALE L.J. 209, 231 (1984) (reviewing JAMES B. WHIT, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEAN-
ING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND CON-
TINurrY (1984)).
66. CULLER, supra note 34, at 240.
67. Stephen Cox, Devices of Deconstruction, 3 CRITICAL REv. 56, 64 (1989).
68. LENTRICCHIA, supra note 27, at 175.
69. CULLER, supra note 34, at 260.
70. "At the beginning, Andy and Edie's [Sedgwick] nights on the town were, as Gerard
Malanga said, something 'you'd read about in F. Scott Fitzgerald.'" VICTOR BOCKRIS, THE
LIFE AND DEATH OF ANDY WARHOL 164 (1989).
71. For a classic account of poseur society, see TRUMAN CAPOTE, ANSWERED PRAYERS
(1987).
72. LEHMAN, supra note 27, at 23. Christopher Norris, the best expositor of Derrida,
says: "It was a paper he gave in 1966 at a conference organized by Johns Hopkins University
that marked the emergence of 'literary' deconstruction as a force in American criticism."
NORRIS, supra note 53, at 13.
73. "Many of these French critics were (and still are) invited to American campuses
where they dazzled students and faculty alike in lectures, gatherings and sometimes courses.
Their appearances became cult-like occasions, and Derrida, for example, could create the pas-
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notoriety by lambasting the established view that the spoken word is su-
perior to writing.74 To him, culture, history, and knowledge come from
writing.75 It was Derrida who popularized the word diffirance to indi-
cate that the meaning is both "differential" and "deferred," "the product
of a restless play within language that cannot be fued or pinned down for
purposes of conceptual definition."'76 Diffirance is "a marginal zone
where the particular, the unique, and the incommensurate may reside in
autonomy from the broader systems that threaten to assimilate, absorb,
or reduce them."' 77 He is famous for the use of similar terms to prevent
"conceptual closure"-the "reduction [of the text] to an ultimate mean-
ing.,,78 As Frank Lentricchia says: "Derrida speaks not of a free-play in
the world, but of a 'freeplay of the world.' ,79
The irony of Derrida's success is that he unsuccessfully seeks status
as a philosopher while achieving widespread recognition among the liter-
ary set. He dominates American literary criticism by giving critics parity
with philosophers.8" Even more disturbing to Derrida disciples like
Christopher Norris is the misuse of deconstruction by Americans:
"[T]hose zealots of a limitless textual 'freeplay' who reject the very no-
tions of rigorous thinking or conceptual critique."'" Eagleton calls the
notion of "freeplay" "a travesty of Derrida's own work."82 This is now a
moot point-the Americans do use Derrida to justify "freeplay."83 They
have, ironically, deconstructed the Master.
Next to Derrida, Paul deMan is the player. In one important re-
spect, he is more celebrated than the Master---deMan is the subject of
sion and attract overflow crowds of believers as easily as, say, Bruce Springsteen." Edward
Engleberg, Another French Revolution, BRANDEIS REv., Winter 1989-90, at 41, 42.
74. For a "portable" Derrida, see JACQUES DERRIDA, A DERRIDA READER: BETWEEN
THE BLINDS (Peggy Kamuf ed., 1991) [hereinafter DERRIDA, A DERRIDA READER].
75. CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, DERRIDA 95 (1987) [hereinafter NORRIS, DERRIDA].
76. Id at 15.
77. HENRY SUSSMAN, HIGH RESOLUTION: CRITICAL THEORY AND THE PROBLEM OF
LITERACY 46 (1989).
78. NORRIS, supra note 53, at 32.
79. LENTRICCHIA, supra note 27, at 168.
80. "His work provided a whole new set of powerful strategies which placed the literary
critic, not simply on a footing with the philosopher, but in a complex relationship (or rivalry)
with him, whereby philosophic claims were open to rhetorical questioning or deconstruction."
NORRIS, supra note 53, at 21.
81. NORRIS, DERRIDA, supra note 75, at 27. Lentricchia agrees. LENTRICCHIA, supra
note 27, at 174-76.
82. EAGLETON, supra note 37, at 148.
83. Derrida's obscure syntax invites "freeplay." "[F]or readers with a lifetime to spare,
there is also a 100-page essay by Jacques Derrida, dealing with a subject yet to be determined."
W. CAIN, THE CRISIS IN CRITICISM: THEORY, LITERATURE, AND REFORM IN ENGLISH
STUDIES 167 (1984).
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one of the most egregious and puzzling scandals in the history of
academe.84
With subdued flair and an iron-willed intelligence, Paul deMan pop-
ularized deconstruction in the United States. Immigrating to this coun-
try following World War II with no money or position he became the
star at Yale, leading the Yale School of Criticism to unparalleled status.85
deMan was the Godfather of the Yale Mafia, "a critic who has always
given the impression of having a grip on truth."86 If Derrida advocates
parameters on interpretation, deMan advocates total subversion, 7 "a
technique of trouble," making the reader "face the trouble already
there."88 To him language can never escape "from the duplicity, the con-
fusion, the untruth that we take for granted in the everyday use of lan-
guage."89 His writing is "special" because it puts the readers in a corner
where they can only make sense of his analyses by "according belief to
what seems implausible or at least unproven."90 After demonstrating
that meaning traces endlessly, deMan demands that the "critic must yet
demonstrate that it has no beginning either."'" He was an expert in aca-
demic warfare and was admired as "the only man who ever looked into
the abyss [of deconstruction] and came away smiling."92
Three years after a death with honors, deMan's reputation was
deconstruted-and destroyed. On December 1, 1987, a New York
Times headline read: Yale Scholar's Articles Found in Nazi Paper.93 Re-
searching for a doctoral dissertation, a young scholar discovered that for
at least two years during the early 1940s, deMan published 170 articles in
the leading pro-Nazi Belgium newspaper Le Soir. Paul deMan was ex-
84. The closest parallel is playwright Lillian Hellman, who was exposed as living a
fabricated life. WILLIAM WRIGHT, LILLIAN HELLMAN: THE IMAGE, THE WOMAN (1986).
85. For a first-rate description and analysis of the Yale school, see THE YALE CRITICS:
DECONSTRUCrION IN AMERICA (Jonathan Arac et al. eds., 1983).
86. LENTRICCHIA, supra note 27, at 284.
87. Oddly, however, though Derrida warned that differance, as the subversion of all
ontological realms, could authoritatively command nothing, the Yale critics have
taken diffrrance as a radically subversive authority which autocratically commands,
as abysme, the whole field of writing, and while doing so establishes writing as a
monolith itself that forever escapes determination.
Id. at 173.
88. DENIS DONOGHUE, FEROCIOUS ALPHABETS 185 (1984).
89. PAUL DEMAN, BLINDNESS AND INSIGHT: ESSAYS IN THE RHETORIC OF CONTEMPO-
RARY CRITICISM 9 (2d ed. 1983).
90. CULLER, supra note 34, at 229.
91. WILLIAM RAY, LITERARY MEANING: FROM PHENOMENOLOGY TO DECONSTRUC-
TION 198 (1984).
92. LEHMAN, supra note 27, at 156.
93. Id. at 158.
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posed as a Nazi collaborationist and propagandist. Things continued to
unravel: He was said to be a "scoundrel." "Swindling, forging, lying
even, were, at least at the time, second nature to him." 94 In addition, a
wife and three children whom he never acknowledged turned up, left
behind when he came to the U.S. Novelist Mary McCarthy, who got
deMan his first teaching job at Bard, summed up years before the scan-
dal: "[He was] given to lying, evasion, fantasy, greed, possibly even
theft-in short plastic and formless, with an intelligence that's outdis-
tanced his morals."95
In the circus that followed the revelations, deconstructionists battled
each other, fought to repel attacks by non-believers, and vilified the press.
Bitter opponents of the decon school saw deMan's collaboration and
cover-up as self-serving and confirmation that deconstruction was a de-
vice to reject history which amounted to nothing more than blatant nihil-
ism.9 6 These opponents proffered belief in the total subversion of the text
as evidence. Not only was deconstruction compatible with Nazism, it
"encourages it." v "If the inevitable outcome of mourning is the incor-
poration of a figure, let us be sure to remember the right one. The
number is six million; their name in history is the Jews."198
To defend deMan, deconers had to repudiate their basic assumption
that meaning is uncertain and never stable. To show that he was irrefut-
ably innocent of the charges of treason-"the facts are otherwise" 99 -his
defenders had to rely on a condition of certainty. If, on the other hand,
they clung onto the belief of constant uncertainty, the charge could be, as
with any reading, "correct"10--at least as to some readers. By opting
for innocence, the defenders rejected aporia, traces, and iteration.
But either deconstruction was or it was not what it had always
previously maintained: an attack on certainty. If it was, then
why were deconstructionists now denying it? If it was not, then
deconstruction had no point at all. In defending deMan, Der-
94. Id. at 187.
95. David Lehman, Paul deMan: The Plot Thickens, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1992, at 1, 19
(book review).
96. "At any rate, shifting attention away from the representational writings of poets, es-
sayists, and fiction writers, and focusing, instead, on the question of how critics read would give
deMan the opportunity to conceal his past, even from himself." DAVID H. HIRSCH, THE
DECONSTRUCTION OF LrrERATURE: CRmcISM AFTER AUSCHWITZ 72 (1991).
97. Letters, Charles Griswold, Jr., Deconstruction, The Nazis, & Paul deMan, N.Y. REV.
BooKs, Oct. 12, 1989, at 69.
98. Tobin Siebers, Mourning Becomes Paul deMan, in REsPONSES ON PAUL DEMAN'S
WARTIME JOURNALISM 363, 366 (1989) [hereinafter REsPONSES].
99. Peter Shaw, The Rise and Fall of Deconstruction, COMMENTARY, Dec. 1991, at 50, 51
(quoting J. Hillis Miller).
100. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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rida, J. Hillis Miller, Geoffrey Hartman, and their followers
ended up doing to deconstruction what deconstruction had set
out to do to meaning and certainty: [T]hey left it ruins.101
To supporters, deMan lived two lives: On the "empirical" level of
reality, he did whatever was necessary to survive; on the "higher" level
he developed theories designed to subvert "every sentiment or prejudice
that had made a mess of his early life in Belgium."10 2 In the most bizarre
twist of the chaos, Derrida and other defenders deconstructed deMan's
pro-Nazi articles to exonerate a fallen comrade. Deconstructing one of
the more notorious articles, Derrida, in "an astonishing 30,000 word
cry of pain,"10 a found a code message defending the Jews. Lehman
summarizes:
Making a deconstructive move you demote the center and ele-
vate the marginal; you repeat yourself, add an emphasis, drop a
qualifier, insert a few parenthetical digressions-and in the end
you get just what you expected to find: [O]ne of those undecid-
able aporias that not only let deMan off the hook, just a little,
but also let you salute deMan's theory of reading in the
process. '0
The stakes are high; if deMan is corrupt, some critics argue, so is
deconstruction.10 5 The puzzle lingers:106 "If one wants to refuse him,
one first has to refute. And who can even recognize where the deManic
lies." 107 Put to the test of interpreting a real life situation, deconstruc-
101. Shaw, supra note 99, at 51.
102. Denis Donoghue, The Strange Case of Paul DeMan, N.Y. Rnv. BooKS, June 29,
1989, at 32, 36.
103. James Atlas, The Case of PaulDeMan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1988, § 6 (Magazine), at
36, 37.
104. LEHMAN, supra note 27, at 238. Bernstein says:
Mr. Derrida's partial defense of deMan itself raises some difficult questions. His
reading of the 1941 article is intense, exhaustive and often persuasive. But is it
merely a clever use of the doctrine of the indeterminacy of the text, a ruse to exoner-
ate deMan? Presumably, Mr. Derrida's text is also subject to a range of interpreta-
tions, including, perhaps, some that he did not intend.
Richard Bernstein, The deMan Affair: Critics Attempt to Reinterpret,4 Colleague's Disturbing
Past, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1988, § 4, at 6.
105. Professor Hirsch is outspoken: "In this world, Paul deMan ... permitted himself to
become an accessory to the Nazi crimes, not by 'transmitting orders,' but by helping to circu-
late the poison that infected the entire society." HIRSCH, supra note 96, at 83.
Derrida seeks to separate deMan from deconstruction by arguing that "[i]t was more than
twenty years after the war that deMan discovered deconstruction." JACQUES DERRIDA,
MEMOIRES FOR PAUL DEMAN 245 (rev. ed. 1989).
106. Louis Menand, The Politics of Deconstruction, N.Y. REv. BooKS, Nov. 21, 1991, at
39.
107. Richard Klein, DeMan's Resistances: A Contribution to the Future Science of deMa-
nology, in RESPONSES, supra note 98, at 295.
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tion's impotence was exposed.'
If Derrida and deMan are the intellectual anchors of the deconstruc-
tion movement, Professor Stanley Fish is the publicity agent and provo-
cateur. 10 9 He is a frequent contributor to law journals, a professor at
Duke Law School, and chairman of the Duke English Department, 10
known as the Fish Bowl. Professor Morris Zapp, an ambitious character
who sprinkles titillating comments in David Lodge's novels, is said to be
patterned on Fish's flashy style.' Like Zapp, he is "a new breed of
superstar as much concerned with professional notoriety as with the
humdrum details of scholarship."' I2 It was Zapp who said, "Well, I'm a
bit of a deconstructionist myself. It's kind of exciting-the last intellec-
tual thrill left. Like sawing through the branch you're sitting on."' 13
Fish's Is There a Text in this Class? is a boilerplate cite in legal
decon. He writes that interpretation is a process of progressively
"decertainizing"'114 the text. "The objectivity of the text is an illusion
and moreover, a dangerous illusion, because it is so physically convinc-
ing."115 Thus, there is no fixed meaning of a text, except in the experi-
ence of the reader "and that experience is compromised the moment you
say something about it.""116 Like Morris Zapp, Fish likes to play games
108. One of the most important consequences of the deMan crisis has been the dem-
onstration that the central tenets and techniques of deconstruction have proven ut-
terly useless in disclosing anything special about controversial texts in a real
situation, as opposed to the abstractions deriving from this or that "reading" of
Rousseau or Nietzsche or whoever, where nothing of consequence is really at stake.
Norman Fruman, Deconstruction, deMan, and the Resistance to Evidence: David Lehman's
Signs of the Times, ACAD. QUESTIONS, Summer 1992, at 34, 45.
109. Professor Fish got some unwelcome publicity when he accused the National Associa-
tion of Scholars of being "racist, sexist, and homophobic." Jeffrey Hart, Epistemological Fas-
cism at Duke, NAT'L REV., Dec. 17, 1990, at 44, 58. The backlash was enough to make Fish
wish he were Morris Zapp, his fictional counterpart in David Lodge's Small World (1984).
The best response came from Professor Hart of Dartmouth: "Of course, this is a lie. But it is
consistent with Stanley Fish's theory of knowledge, which holds that there is no objective and
checkable truth." Hart, supra, at 58.
110. [A]dministrators here are apparently very proud of the Duke English depart-
ment, since they hold it up as some kind of jewel in the university's crown. While
some of those in the new wave might be as good as they say, one wonders whether or
not the university hasn't been victimized by its own press releases.
Interview with Kenny J. Williams, Caste and Class in a University Town, ACAD. QUESTIONS,
Spring 1991, at 41, 49.
111. ROGER KIMBALL, TENURED RADICALS: How POLITICS HAS CORRUPTED OUR
HIGHER EDUCATION 146 (1990).
112. Adam Begley, Souped-Up Scholar, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1992, § 6 (Magazine), at 38.
113. DAVID LODGE, SMALL WORLD: AN ACADEMIC ROMANCE 118 (MacMillan Books,
1984).
114. STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 23 (1980).
115. Ide at 43.
116. d at 65.
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to baffle and stay ahead of his colleagues and rivals.117 Anticipating
George Will's effort to intellectualize baseball, 18 Fish deconstructed
Dennis Martinez and Earl Weaver."19 He seemed to be adopting a form
of literary populism which allows the reader the discretion to define his
own experience as the meaning-a meaning that has no more validity
than any other.1 20
Nevertheless, Fish avoids the trap of indeterminacy. He argues that
interpretation is, after all, restrained by the existence of "interpretive
communities." These "communities" are groups composed "of those
who share interpretive strategies not for reading (in the conventional
sense) but for writing texts, for constituting their properties and as-
signing their intentions." '21 In reality, this does not change anything;
interpretation is still fluid. Communities grow and decline, "providing
just enough stability for the interpretive battles to go on, and just enough
shift and slippage to assume that they will now be settled." 122 In theory,
the critic "loses the freedom to choose between the establishment and the
opposition." 
1 23
II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT DECONSTRUCTED
Deconstruction is generally practiced in two ways or two styles,
although it most often grafts one on to the other. One takes on
the demonstrative and apparently a historical allure of logico-
formal paradoxes. The other, more historical or more
anamnesic, seems to proceed through readings of texts, meticu-
lous interpretation and genealogies.124
As a political missile and plastic word game, law deconstruction has
117. Ray first says that Fish "is not normally associated with post-structuralism," then
deconstructs himself. "[Hlis sustained effort to formulate a notion of meaning transcendent of
the subjective/objective opposition does culminate in a historical version of Derrida's iter-
ability that displays most of the hallmarks of post-structuralism." RAY, supra note 91, at 152.
118. GEORGE F. WILL, MEN AT WORK: THE CRAFr OF BASEBALL (1990). But see DAN
JENKINS, You GOTrA PLAY HURT 285 (1991) ("Most baseball players were a sorry lot, as I
had known them, basically the dumbest and lowest-rent collection of athletes I had ever en-
countered . .. ").
119. Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987).
120. "Literary populism... gives the reader the 'right' to fabricate his own private mean-
ing of a work, as if this were an extension of the citizen's right to his opinion." Gerald Graff,
Culture and Anarchy, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 14, 1981, at 36.
121. FISH, supra note 114, at 171.
122. Id. at 172.
123. PHILIP GOLDSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
MARXIST CRITICIsM 196 (1990).
124. Derrida, supra note 54, at 957-59.
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no limits. It has been applied to areas of the law such as contracts, 125
torts, 126 labor, 127 and gender,128 to name several. Nothing is off limits,
however explicit, however settled. 129  With one interesting exception
(which I will discuss), the Second Amendment has escaped a workout by
the deconstructionist. This oversight is surprising since it is an ideal text;
short and concise but full of hidden tensions residing in the margins and
folds waiting to be manipulated' 3°--the classic tug between the ingenious
and obtuse.' It contains enough stress and gaps to give Professor Mor-
ris Zapp multiple Aporia orgasms.' 32 A cunning deconstructionist can
find within the amendment's text oppression, capitalism, "no nukes," or
"a nuke in every home." The Second Amendment says:
"'A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed. "133
The conventional-"privileged"-interpretation is: In a democratic
form of government there is always the possibility of an internal coup by
totalitarian forces who would use the standing army to gain control. Cit-
izen militia, either organized or acting as guerrillas-may be last resort
125. Clare Dalton, Deconstructing Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985).
126. See, eg., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3 (1988).
127. See, eg., Karl Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE PoLrTcs OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 65 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
128. See, eg., Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989).
129. This includes the Constitutional Provision that "No Person ... shall be eligible to the
Office of President... who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five Years.... ." U.S.
CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 5.
The age requirement could refer to a "certain level of maturity." Gary Peller, The Meta-
physics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1174 (1985). Professor D'Amato attacks the
provision head-on; he assumes that provisions of the Constitution are subject to amendment
and thus "must be assumed to have been superseded or qualified by any relevant amendment."
Now comes the aporia. He refers to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as "relevant."
"Age discrimination-in a matter that restricts the right of the people to elect a President of
their own choosing-would clearly violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment, and
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment." Anthony
D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the Under-Aged President, 84 Nw.
U. L. REV. 250, 255 (1989).
According to my colleague Erik Jensen, while "funny," D'Amato's deconstruction is "ut-
ter nonsense."
130. It has been called "one of the worst drafted of all [constitutional] provisions." San-
ford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 644 (1989).
131. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 242.
132. In his famous striptease, Zapp said: "The reader plays with himself as the text plays
upon him, plays upon his curiosity, desire, as a striptease dancer plays upon her audience's
curiosity and desire." LODGE, supra note 113, at 26.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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defenders and thus must be assured of a supply of arms. 134 Whether the
Second Amendment refers to a collective right exclusively limited to or-
ganized militia or national guard (exclusively state's right view) or also
constitutes a private constitutional right (individual right) is a matter of
dispute. 135
A. Derrida and Clint Eastwood Decon the Second Amendment
A well-regulated militia Nov. 3o First These in the day when heaven wasfalling
The let rns.loal being necessary segmeat of goose The hour when earth's foundations fiea
M ayArmy .ed,
. edtod, to the security and brant eason ends-' Followed their mercenary calling
0 _ ,,, of a free state, And took their wages and are dead
11retdme emb0ershlp, t e right of the people Their shoulders held the sky suspended,.
€¢rtifictle, one-year -- x -eyt rcd f.to keep and bear heHouse reictd They stood, and earth ' foundations stay;
aL. Or write fa lWf
, arms a Proposed ban on assault What God abandoned these defended
shall not be infringed, weapons... And saved the sum of things for pay.I"
one day after 22 people were slain by a gunman. ... MAKE MY DAY s=0,ooo paid fr
that killed Oswald"'
The above is a "Double Session;"' 14 1 it imitates the visual impres-
sions created by Derrida's Glas in which he juxtaposed quotations from
134. See Peter Feller et al., The Second Amendment" A Second Look, 61 Nw. U. L. REv.
46, 52 (1966).
135. See, eg., David Caplan, The Right of the Individual to Bear Arms: A Recent Judicial
Trend, 1982 DET. C.L. REv. 789-93.
136. Calendar, AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 15, 1991, at B6.
137. A.E. HOUSmAN, Epitaph on an Army of Mercenaries, in COLLECTED POEMS 144
(1959).
138. Jeffrey Birnbaum, Assault Weapon Ban is Rejected by the House, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18,
1991, at A16.
139. Steve Marshall, $220,000 Paid For Gun That Killed Oswald, USA TODAY, Dec. 27-29,
1991, at 1.
140. Classified, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, April 1986, at 112.
141. "The Double Session" is one example of a technique that Derrida frequently uses
to bring home the effects of intertextuality, the ways in which writing cannot be
contained within the limits of a book, an authoritative discourse or self-enclosed sys-
tem of meaning. This technique takes the form of a graphic reminder, of printing
two very different texts on a single page and virtually forcing the reader's eye to
shuttle incessantly between them.
NORRIS, supra note 53, at 46.
The Double Session technique is by no means original with Derrida. According to Wil-
liam S. Burroughs' biographer, Burroughs discovered a similar technique by accident; a friend
sliced through a pile of newspapers, then made a mosaic out of the strips. Calling this the cut-
up method, Burroughs cut out strips-sentences, words, paragraphs---and mixed them to cre-
ate a new form of literature.
It made explicit a simple sensory process that was going on all the time anyway-
which is that when you're reading a newspaper, say, you're reading one column but
you see the other columns as well, and the bus you're on and the person sitting next
to you. There was a juxtaposition of what you were doing and what was happening
around you. What the cut-up method did was incorporate that juxtaposition. Mar-
cel Duchamp had done it years before by placing four unconnected texts in four
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Hegel and Genet' 42-- the former a philosopher, the latter a thief-turned
writer. A reading of a double session "should no longer be carried out as
a simple table of concepts or words, as a static or statistical sort of punc-
tuation." 143 My objective is to create an "unexpected encounter" of bru-
tality and bravery:"4 The advertisement from Soldier of Fortune
illustrates the contemporary corrupt associations that collect around the
Constitution and Second Amendment, while A.E. Housman's poetry re-
minds us of the many foreigners who fought to make the Second Amend-
ment possible. As Derrida said, we are faced with "a double that nothing
anticipates, nothing at least that is not itself already double."14 What
we get is a sense of invasion; each side of text "invades" the other's space
and "play[s] havoc with the logic of meaning." '146 Everything becomes
elusive and evasive. "While reading one column you are reminded that
the gist lies elsewhere."1 47 Housman's poem appears, at least typograph-
ically, privileged, but in fact must contend with the acid reference to the
House vote. Likewise, hunting geese collide with a human bloodbath(-
does it?)."g4 Traces shout everywhere, mixing and attacking, confirming
Derrida's view that ideas come from all texts and that "terms are indis-
sociably entwined in a strictly undecidable exchange of values and priori-
ties."' 14 9 It's like footnotes barking 50 from below the line-an encounter
between texts is "like going downstairs to answer the doorbell while mak-
divisions of a square. Von Neumann had introduced the cut-up principle of random
action in his Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.
TED MORGAN, LITERARY OUTLAW 321 (1988). To Burroughs, the idea of mixing up a
Shakespeare sonnet and an Eisenhower speech was a great breakthrough. When he described
cut-ups to Samuel Beckett, the latter snorted: "That's not writing, it's plumbing." Id. at 323.
Burroughs even thought "that by mixing up medical articles they would locate a cure for
cancer." Id. at 324.
142. For a reprint of a page from Glas, see DERRIDA, A DERRIDA READER, supra note 74,
at 172. Norris said: "I shall not have very much to say about Glas since it is a work (like
Finnegans Wake (sic)) that defeats the best efforts of descriptive analysis or summary." NOR-
RIS, DERRIDA, supra note 75, at 46.
143. JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION 194 (Barbara Johnson trans., 1981).
144. "On every page, Glas demonstrates the borderless condition of texts, and their suscep-
tibility to the most unexpected encounters." NORRIS, DERRIDA, supra note 75, at 315.
145. Id. at 206.
146. NORRIS, supra note 53, at 24.
147. CULLER, supra note 34, at 136.
148. For a Double Session graphic that uses a collection of views on deconstruction to
create a pattern of collusion, see Arthur Austin, What Differs? Who Differs? What is the Diffdr-
ance?, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 1351 (1991).
149. NORRIS, DERRIDA, supra note 75, at 56.
150. "[T]he 'barking' from the cellar of the page has taken over." Arthur Austin, Footnote
Skulduggery and Other Bad Habits, 44 MIAMI L. REv. 1009, 1011 (1990) (citing Stanley
Tobin, Book Review, 11 STAN. L. REV. 410, 412 (1959)).
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ing love." '151 (What is a brant anyway?) 152
. Radical Chic Crit
A familiar tactic for radical crits is to use deconstruction to expose
an oppressive meaning lurking in what appears to be a benign "privi-
leged" interpretation. Hence my hypothetical crit deconstructionist-
"the lawyer as janitor" ' 3-would seek to show that the Second Amend-
ment was not intended to protect citizens against the dangers of a stand-
ing army-the privileged interpretation. Instead it was meant to be used
to protect the interests of property owners and rich merchants-the priv-
ileged capitalist class of today's society. As John Jay said: "'The people
who own the country ought to govern it.' ,154
In this case, the most productive maneuver is to look to the "mar-
gins" of fugitive incidents of English history to get something that sub-
verts the privileged meaning. The deconer knows that there is always a
counter interpretation lurking somewhere in the margin. In this case, it
is the English Game Act of 1671 which said that to lawfully keep a gun
or bow, one had to have an income of at least 100 pounds-except those
who were above the rank of esquire or owners (or keepers) of forests. 1 5
This law confirms the English "distrust of the lower classes,"' 56 an atti-
tude that persisted in the Colonies.
151. The line between deconstruction and footnoting is as thin as snake hair. For example,
Bowersock cites Noel Coward for the above comment. G.W. Bowersock, The Art of the Foot-
note, 53 AM. SCHOLAR 54 (1983-84). The Wall Street Journal used the comment without
attribution. Paul Barrett, To Read This Story in Full, Don't Forget to See the Footnotes, WALL
ST. J., May 10, 1988, at I n.l. Rice, in a subsequent article, gave attribution to me. Timothy
R. Rice, In Defense of Footnotes, NAT'L L.J., June 20, 1988, at 13, 14 n.13. In concluding that
"the boilerplate attribution may be wrong and, worse, bowdlerized," Aaron M. Fine offered
the following quote by Coward's biographer:
My interpolations in quotations from Noel's writings and letters are contained within
square brackets, which will I hope make for smoother reading and will avoid the
bane of footnotes, which Noel would have hated. He could never bring himself to
glance at one, he said, after John Barrymore expressed the opinion that having to
look at a footnote was like having to go down to answer the front door just as you
were -.
Letter from Aaron M. Fine, NAT'L L.J., July 4, 1988, at 12 (quoting Cole Lesley).
152. "The smallest species of wild goose." OxFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY 215 (3d ed.
1955).
153. Ken Emerson, When Legal Titans Clash, N.Y. TIMES, (Magazine), April 22, 1990, at
26, 66 (attributing description to Professor Duncan Kennedy).
154. CLARENCE CRAMER, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE: FREE AND NOT So FREE 105 (1972)
(quoting John Jay).
155. Caplan, supra note 135, at 797; see David Hardy, The Second Amendment and the
Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL. 1, 19 (1987).
156. Robert Cottrol et al., The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-American Reconsider-
ation, 80 GEo. L.J. 309, 319 (1991).
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With this information from the margin on the table, the privileged
meaning is less determinate, and thus more problematical. 57 A few
more fugitive footnotes from the margins such as medieval law allocating
arms on the basis of social and political status" 8 and the French protect-
ing the class interests of the nobility by prohibiting commoners from pos-
sessing swords as well as guns'5 9 and-aporia ! French class bias favoring
arms is fed back to the trace as part of the motion of the arrow, which
continues to challenge the privileged meaning of the Second Amend-
ment. As a text, it is "no longer a finished corpus of writing, some con-
tent enclosed in a book or its margin, but a differential network, a fabric
of traces referring endlessly to something other than itself, to other differ-
ential traces."'"
If one stopped at this point, 6 ' one would have a competing--or
"correct"--interpretation: The Amendment allows the monied class to
maintain its own private militias-or "police"i-to protect its property or
to stifle opposition to its imperialist business practices. The "corrective-
ness" of this decoding is dramatized by the Pinkerton detectives who
offered a service known as the "guard system" which was "a uniformed
military organization designed to prevent crime by guarding certain busi-
nesses at night."' 62 Pinkerton's became notorious for strike breaking,
prompting a famous ballad, "Father Was Killed by the Pinkerton
Men."' 63 They remain today as a shadow police force.' Hence, to the
crit, the Second Amendment marginalizes, rather than protects, the
lower classes.
157. A crit buzzword comparable to the yuppie's "minimalism." See MARISSA PIESMAN
ET AL., THE YUPPIE HANDBOOK 23 (1984).
158. James B. Whisker, Historical Development and Subsequent Erosion of the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms, 78 W. VA. L. REV. 171, 175 (1975-76).
159. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 235 n.137 (1983).
160. DERRIDA, A DERRIDA READER, supra note 74, at 257.
161. Crits inevitably stop deconing when they uncover a politically correct interpretation.
See infra note 294 and accompanying text.
162. FRANK MORN, THE EYE THAT NEVER SLEEPS 98-99 (1982); ag., GEORGE O'TOOLE,
THE PRIVATE SECTOR: PRIVATE SPIES, RENT-A-CoPS, AND THE POLICE-INDUSTRIAL COM-
PLEX (1978).
163. "God help them tonight in the hour of their affliction Praying for him who they'll
ne'er meet again Hear the poor orphans tell their sad story Father was killed by the Pinkerton
men." MORN, supra note 162, at 103 (quoting S. G. SPAETH, WEEP SOME MORE MY LADY,
235 (1927)).
164. See Michael Allen, Big Security Companies, Branching Out, See Some Flecks of Gold
in Private Eyes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1991, at Bl.
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C. Feminist Deconstruction of Second Amendment PhallogocentrismI65
There were no founding mothers at the 1787 Constitutional
Convention, and the founding fathers had decided views about
women's place in society.166
A feminist deconstruction focuses on the patriarchal implications
circulating in the Second Amendment.167 Her perspective toward the
Amendment is from "the experience of being watched, seen as a 'girl,'
restricted, marginalized."' 68 The feminist deconstructionist looks for
hidden implications in the word "arms"-and finds paydirt. Arms sym-
bolize the male ethic of individualism, power, 169 and aggression. 170 Be-
ginning with the Revolutionary War, when dueling became "an
American institution, ' 17 and extending to today's gang wars, arms have
defined machismo. The Founding Fathers expressed "'an almost reli-
gious quality about the relationship between men and arms.' 1172 Hunt-
ing-the use of arms to kill animals-is considered a "rite of passage for
young males." 173 Arms are used to sexually exploit women.174 The
Supreme Court has helped as a source of "margins."175  In interpreting
165. That's why I created the term 'phallogocentrism,' to refer to one single structure
of thought which both gives priority to logos and the voice, the phone, and to the
masculine position in philosophy.... I've tried to highlight a connection between
the statement of masculinity, the placing of a man in a hierarchical position over
woman, politically, sociologically, philosophically, and ontologically as well, the
connection between that and logocentrism.
RAOtJL MORTLEY, FRENCH PHILOSOPHERS IN CONVERSATION 104 (1991) (quoting Jacques
Derrida from an interview).
166. Ruth B. Ginsburg et al., Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 12.
167. "Under patriarchy, men are the model and the embodiment of the fully human; to
maintain their status and power, men are entitled to exercise both subtle and violent control
over women." Lynne Henderson, Law's Patriarchy, 25 LAw & Soc. lRv. 411, 412 (1991).
168. CULLER, supra note 34, at 44.
169. "Men have never had any problem with the concept of power. They want it purely,
directly, unapologetically, libidinously. It is their entitlement and driving force." Maureen
Dowd, Power: Are Women Afraid of it-Or Beyond It?, WORKING WOMAN, Nov. 1991, at 98.
170. A colleague tells me that a "big" Saturday night in Oklahoma was "the boys getting
together to clean their guns." Sept. 16, 1991, 11:40 a.m.
171. WILLIAM 0. STEvENs, PISTOLS AT TEN PACES: THE STORY OF THE CODE OF
HONOR IN AMERICA 30 (1940).
172. Kates, supra note 159, at 229 (quoting C. Asbury, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms
in America: The Origins and Application of the Second Amendment to the Constitution 88
(1988) (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Michigan)).
173. See, e.g., William Faulkner, The Bear, in THE PORTABLE FAULKNER 227 (Malcolm
Cowley ed., 1954).
174. "Eight topless beauties captured on tape firing exotic weapons into the Sierra Nevada
mountains, featuring the world's best machine guns and assault weapons. HOT GUN-HOT
GIRLS!" Advertisement, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, Nov. 1991, at 68.
175. Marginal may refer to status, such as a minority or female, or to a source of repressed
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the Amendment, the Court quotes with approval the definition of the
principle of the assize of arms as implying "the general obligation of all
male inhabitants to possess arms." '176 Colonial America required every
male to serve in the militia and to keep and maintain his own arms.'77
Moreover, weapons are like Maypoles 78 and, with their phallic connota-
tions, are phallogocentric.179 The owner of the New England Patriots
football team-a sport that serves as a womb for macho types-jokingly
compared his players' genitalia to Patriot missiles.' Thomas Jefferson
had patriarchy on his mind when he wrote Washington: "One loves to
possess arms."""8 A man's world is classic patriarchy: "[A] world with-
out rules ... sentimental [men], weeping over a thousand points of light,
while reading about Iraqi body counts dry-eyed."' 82 The penis, the ulti-
(oppressed) meaning. The latter meaning is used here. "Another common operation is that
which takes a minor, unknown text and grafts it onto the main body of the tradition, or else
takes an apparently marginal element of a text, such as a footnote, and transplants it to a vital
spot." CULLER, supra note 34, at 139.
To seek out the marginal is to identify elements heretofore thought to be unimportant.
This is an identification of the exclusions on which hierarchies may depend and by
which they might be disrupted but it is also the beginning of an encounter with previ-
ous readings which, in separating a text into the essential and marginal elements,
have created for the text an identity that the text itself, through the power of its
marginal elements, can subvert.
Id. at 215.
176. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939) (emphasis added).
177. Kates, supra note 159, at 214.
178. RICHARD P. KNIGHT ET AL., SEXUAL SYMBOLISM: A HISTORY OF PHALLIC WOR-
smip 93 (1966).
179. Nothing stays the same, and the search for a unified field theory of oppression
has led to a new deconstructive catchall for the metaphysical conspiracy at the bot-
tom of our woe. The trendy coinage is phallogocentrism, a merger of logocentrism
and phallocentrism. The right-minded critic sets out to undo "patriarchal" assump-
tions. In particular, you want-as one enthusiast puts it-to deconstruct "singular-
ity, embodied in the phallus, asserted in logos, inscribed in an egotistical I."
LEHMAN, supra note 27, at 103.
Modem society, as the post-structuralists would say, is "phallocentric"; it is also, as
we have seen, "logocentric", believing that its discourses can yield us immediate ac-
cess to the full truth and presence of things. Jacques Derrida has conflated these two
terms to the compound "phallogocentric", which we might roughly translate as
"cocksure". It is this cocksureness, by which those who wield sexual and social
power maintain their grip ....
EAGLETON, supra note 37, at 189.
180. "On Feb. 4, Kiam, continuing in his buffoon's role, told a joke at a dinner .... saying
that what Olson and the Iraqi army had in common was that they had both seen Patriot
missiles up close." Leigh Montville, Season of Torment, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 13, 1991,
at 65. Kiam was referring to allegations of genital exposure by three New England players to a
female sports writer.
181. Don B. Kates, Jr. et al., How to Make Their Day, NAT'L REv., Oct. 21, 1991, at 30,
31.
182. Phillis Theroux, Man and Animal at Yale, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 25, 1991, at A23.
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mate weapon of patriarchy, is used to invade, possess, and subjugate wo-
men."'3 "ITIhe gun," as noted by Richard Hofstadter, "cannot and will
not be given up because it is a basic symbol of masculinity."'8 4
The net effect is that the accepted meaning of the Amendment has a
new, more subtle, context: "[I]t is not a single structure with a privileged
relationship to the process of communication as it occurs in any situation
but a structure that changes when one situation, with its assumed back-
ground of practices, purposes, and goals, has given way to another."' 85
Sources from the margin, hidden in the fold, show that patriarchy is the
real context and that the Second Amendment preaches this ethic by per-
mitting, actually endorsing, the use of force by males to protect their
castle and what Fortune calls a "trophy wife."' 8 6 Since every man's cas-
tle subsumes married women as property, 8 7 this further stigmatizes wo-
men as oppressed and keeps "his... foot on her throat."'8 8 It is a form
of male domination at work in the margins of the Constitution8 9 and
demonstrates an effort to maintain the universal custom of subjection of
women to men.' 90 "Palm Beach society is now free to play."' 91 The
183. "His thrusting into her is taken to be her capitulation to him as a conqueror; it is a
physical surrender of herself to him; he occupies and rules her, expresses his elemental domi-
nance over her, by his possession of her in the fuck." ANDREA DwoCiuN, INTERCOURSE 63
(1987).
184. Richard Hofstadter, America as a Gun Culture, AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1970, at 82.
185. FiSH, supra note 114, at 318.
186. "Powerful men are beginning to demand trophy wives. 'The culture of self-indulgence
has just crept up to the CEO level .... Indulgence is an issue for people who have worked
very hard to get where they are. They feel they've earned it, they're entitled to it.'" Julie
Connelly, The CEO's Second Wife, FORTUNE, Aug. 28, 1989, at 52 (quoting Harry Levinson).
187. At common law it was a man's world. Husband and wife were one, and the one
was the husband. The married woman had little control over her property. She
could not make a will. She could bring no actions except in conjunction with her
husband, even in cases of personal assault upon her. Her husband could collect her
choses in action and keep the proceeds. Property-wise her position was one of almost
complete dependence on the male-her husband, her son, and others-the most
striking manifestation being the ability of her deceased husband's collateral relatives
to protect their inheritances by subjecting her person to the indignities of the writ de
ventre inspiciendo.
JAMES CASNER ET AL., CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 220 (3d ed. 1984).
188. Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BuFF. L. REv.
11, 74-75 (1985).
189. "[Male dominance is perhaps the most pervasive and tenacious system of power in
history[;] ... it is metaphysically nearly perfect." Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marx-
ism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 638 (1983).
190. JOHN S. MILL, The Subjection of Women, in A SELECTION OF His WORKS 259, 261
(J. Robson ed., 1963).
191. "With the trial of William K. Smith and all the unwelcome publicity and scrutiny that
came with it finally over, this enclave of wealth and privilege is breathing a sigh of relief."
Larry Rohter, Palm Beach Society is Now Free to Play, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1991, at A26.
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"A" in the word "arms" is a sadistic and sexist twist of the Scarlet Let-
ter.1 92 Moreover, the feminist can detect even more repression: The rec-
ognition and elevation of arms as the function of the male characteristics
of autonomy, individualism and aggression, expressly rejects the femi-
nine "voice" which seeks community, nurturing, and the ethic of care.
19 3
Deconstructed, the Second Amendment is a legacy of the patriarchal
warrior culture in which women were reified as possessions, "while men
became the reifiers because they conquered and protected." 194 It encour-
ages threats of "dlitorectomy" on women lawyers. 9
D. The NRAs Turn
If the crits and feminists can deconstruct to satisfy their agendas,
the National Rifle Association (NRA) can deconstruct to find a "cor-
rect" version of the Second Amendment. Their ideal scenario includes
the right of every individual citizen to bear arms and, more importantly,
a guarantee as to the discretion in the selection of arms.1 96
According to privileged history, it was the colonists' fear of the
power of a standing army, controlled by the central government, that
motivated the Second Amendment.1 97 They remembered incidents like
"the repeated efforts of the British Governor, General Gage, to prevent
the formation of a militia by the tactic of disarming the colonists and
confiscating their stores of arms."19 Even that legendary pacifist, Gan-
dhi, chastised the British for disarming the Indian people.1 99 Hence the
explanation for the reference to the necessity of a "well-regulated mili-
tia." But a close look at the margin uncovers a tension, a challenge.
192. NATHANIAL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETrER (1850).
193. See infra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
194. GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 49 (1986).
195. "Threatening an adversary with harm to her private parts is not so funny, ruled an
Illinois disciplinary panel." The letter said: "'Should you succeed on your motion, we would
... send somebody over to perform a clitorectomy [sic] on you.'" The author's explanation:
He thought "she 'would get a kick out of' the letter." Randall Samborn, Lawyer Repri-
manded, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 2, 1991, at 2.
196. Including explosives: "Powerful explosives from common fertilize [sic]. For step by
step instructions send $1.00 and stamped envelope to.... " Miscellaneous, GUNS MAO., Nov.
1991, at 102.
197. Whisker, supra note 158, at 178; see Stuart R. Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, A Study
in Judicial Misinterpretation, 2 WM. & MARY L. REv. 381, 397 (1960).
198. David I. Caplan, Restoring The Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited, 5 FORD-
HAM URB. LJ. 31, 35 (1976).
199. "Gandhi listed as his major grievance against the British their disarming of the Indian
people: [G]ive us back our arms, he said, and then we will decide whether or not we wish to
use them." Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: The Right to Bear Arms, 2 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 119, 121 (1990).
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What happens if the local militia, the last resort against the tyranny of
the standing army, is somehow subverted? Suppose the militia loses its
independence?
In reality, the militia has never been independent; it has been used to
break strikes2 ' ° and, as recently as 1970, was used against college stu-
dents at Kent State.201 Moreover, the state militias are now under the
control of the federal government.2 °2 Under these circumstances, the in-
dividual right theory becomes compelling as a last barrier against the
double threat of a militia and standing army. This perspective invokes
another tension: How can individuals expect to cope with the brute fire-
power of two armies? It is much worse than dealing with General Gage
and his muskets.
The NRA deconstructed answer: Balance the odds, allow the indi-
vidual citizen parity with the threat by allowing them access to the most
modem weaponry, i.e., "part of the ordinary military equipment. 20 3
The editor of Soldier of Fortune says: "[T]he U.S. Constitution protects
the right of individuals to keep and bear arms for use by a well-regulated
militia-meaning military weapons .... ,,2  The operative phrase is mil-
itary weapons. Even more significant is the fact that the first Senate did
not "limit the Second Amendment to keeping and bearing of arms 'for
the common defense,'" thus "against a narrow construction of 'arms' to
those suitable for militia or military duty. '20 5 Hence, individual citizens
are entitled to own and operate weapons like rocket launchers, machine
guns, and tanks.2 6 Next, the Bomb in every backyard.
200. GUSTAVUS MYERS, HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES 247 (1936).
201. See JAMES MICHENER, KENT STATE: WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY 188 (1971).
202. National Defense Act, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166 (1916), repealed by Act of Aug. 10, 1956,
ch. 1041, § 1, 70A Stat. 1; Act of June 28, 1947, ch. 168, 61 Stat. 191, repealed by Act of Jan.
2, 1968, 81 Stat. 756; see Monte M.F. Cooper, Note, Perpich v. Department of Defense Fed-
eralism Values and the Militia Clause, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 637, 640 n.20 (1991).
203. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
204. Robert K. Brown, Command Guidance, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE, Sept. 1991, at 1
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. II) (emphasis added).
205. David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Sec-
ond Amendment, 9 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 559, 631 (1986) (quoting JOURNAL OF THE
FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE 77 (1820)).
206. Since modem weapons are expensive, only the rich could have their own tanks. To
equalize the opportunity, the less affluent could entice sponsors like tennis players. Similar to
Andre Agassi, tanks would sit in the backyard with: "Sponsored by Bud-The Tank with the
Gusto." Selling arms to private parties would help support a sagging industry that now de-
pends on foreign sales. See Amy Borrus et al., A New World Order for U.S. Arms Makers,
Bus. WK., Nov. 25, 1991, at 48, 49.
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E. Using Deconstruction To Make First Strike Policy
The first strike nuclear policy has been thwarted through decon-
struction of the Second Amendment. An English professor laments the
prospect of a President's exercising the discretion of pushing the button
without some form of external oversight.20 7 Her source of a margin is
Article I, Section 8, which requires Congressional approval for war. To
the Professor, this section indicates a wide distribution of authority
among the citizenry to make war: "[C]onsent and the express act of con-
tract become more explicit, not less explicit, at moments of war. 20 8 She
then connects the Second Amendment to the "distribution theory" and
concludes that its purpose was to disperse authorization to use arms for
military actions "throughout the population in the widest possible
way.''2°9 Her objective is to deconstruct first strike discretion by using
the Second Amendment to require that "the declaration passes through
many numerical gates in order to go into effect."21 0
The response from a commentator shows the built-in dilemma hid-
ing in deconstruction: If Professor Scarry can create a "new interpretive
consensus," then so can the NRA rely on Stanley Fish's interpretive
community to support its views.21 1 "One can easily imagine the counter-
argument constructed by a legal scholar hired by the National Rifle As-
sociation, which would tend to the conclusion that everyone should have
a nuke in his backyard. '212
F. The Right to a Coat of Arms
A deconstruction ... always has for its target to reveal the
existence of hidden articulations and fragmentations within as-
sumably monodic totalities.213
An ingenious deconer can manipulate the Second Amendment so
that it has nothing to do with weapons, but instead assures the right to a
coat of arms.
When the Second Amendment was enacted, titles of nobility were
condemned as symbols of tyranny and thus not recognized by the fram-
ers of the Constitution. That populist instinct-"an ideological tradi-
207. See Scarry, supra note 199, at 124.
208. Id. at 120.
209. Id at 121.
210. Id at 123.
211. Peter Brooks, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Narratives: A Response to Elaine Scarry,
2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 129, 131 (1990).
212. Id at 130.
213. CULLER, supra note 34, at 247 (quoting PAUL DEMAN, ALLEGORIES OF READING:
FIGURAL LANGUAGE IN ROUSSEAU, NIETZSHE, RILKE, AND PROUST 249 (1979)).
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tion"-remains intact today.215 Then, as now, merit and achievement
are, at least ideally, the factors that determine status. From the guises of
social mobility the first shadow from the margin appears. Having ban-
ished the titles of nobility as anti-democratic expressions of corruption,
the framers nevertheless recognized the status of gentlemen as consistent
with their ideals, a status that any male could achieve through hard
work. In fact, they, the framers, were gentlemen. In short, the gen-
tleman was to be the ideal of the new country.216 "America is 'status-
obsessed' given to inventing and reforming 'the age-old idea of the gen-
tleman to fit the circumstances of a commercial culture.' "217 This is the
shady side of the marginal interpretation; the framers wanted to establish
a new class-the gentleman-and needed a way to protect it. And when
given a new reading, this is what the Second Amendment does.
The "points of juncture and stress"2 are in the words-"keep,"
"bear," and "arms." These terms have to be extricated from the ordi-
nary relationship of adjoining words. "Arms" refers to heraldry or coats
of arms. "There is no reason why any American should not bear arms, if
entitled to them; in fact, there is every reason why he should bear them
.... "219 The word "bear" assures people of the right to publicly display
the design. Finally, the reference to "keep" is significant;22 to "keep" a
coat of arms means that all hereditary rights are protected from political
interference. "A man's son would feel a natural pride in preserving the
memorial of his father's reputation, by assuming, and also by transmit-
214. William Schneider, JFK's Children: The Class of '74, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March
1989, at 35, 45.
215. Jim Hightower, I Do Not Choose to Run: Raising Issues, Hope and Hell, 248 THE
NATION 160, 161 (1989). See generally Sidney Blumenthal, Populism in Tweeds, NEW REPUB-
LIC, Nov. 15, 1991, at 10 (describing the new populist movement in the United States).
216. Sir Thomas Smith offers this definition of gentleman:
They may be good cheap in this kingdom: [For whosoever studieth the laws of the
realm, who studieth in the universities, who professeth the liberal sciences, and, to be
short, who can live idly, and without manual labor, and will bear the port, charge,
and countenance of a gentleman, he shall be called master, and shall be taken for a
gentleman.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *406 (quoting Sir Thomas Smith, Common-
wealth of England, b.1, c.20)).
217. Benjamin DeMott, 'Visions of Gentility,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1991, at 24 (book re-
view) (quoting DAVID CASTRONovo, THE AMERICAN GENTLEMAN 15 (1991)).
218. "It is clear, however, that deconstruction is, among other things, an attempt to iden-
tify grafts in the texts it analyzes: [W]hat are the points of juncture and stress where one scion
or line of argument has been spliced with another?" CULLER, supra note 34, at 135.
219. EUGENE ZIEBER, HERALDRY IN AMERICA 75 (1984).
220. "The concept of keeping has no special military connotation. Keeping is not often
used in any but a common sense." Hardy, supra note 205, at 629.
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ting, his device. 2 2 1
At this point, the reference in the first phrase of the Amendment to
a militia makes sense. Militia is a group used to conduct war and war is
the origin for the use of coats of arms. In battle, arms identified com-
rades. "Arms let us know, if the Bearers are Noblemen or Gentlemen,
and what their Dignity is; that appearing by their Helmets ....
III. THE NEW CHIC IN LAW SCHOOL
The critical legal studies movement has undermined the central
ideas of modem legal thought .... 223
Deconstruction is the ideal pastime for narcissistic literary types
dedicated to parlor word games and writing silly articles on Batman as
homosexual camp.2 24 They toast impotence. The more grotesque the
fad, the more fervent the dedication. 225 But deconstruction is now fash-
ionable in law schools, where students are supposedly taught to ignore
mush and "logic-chop." It is, indeed, one of the most bizarre events in
legal education: a French fad on literary criticism threatening to change
the course of legal education. Obviously the question is-why?
Unknown to alumni struggling to survive in a tight market,226 law
schools today bear little resemblance to the enterprises of the 1960s and
'70s. Despite turmoil in the university system during those years, law
schools remained enclaves of vocationalism and traditionalism.
227
Things have changed. The major difference is in thepersona and aspira-
tions of a new group of young faculty who trickled in during the late
1970s. They are legacies of the anti-Vietnam movement who endeavor to
carry on the spirit of Jerry Rubin's Do It! 228 mentality. Pot belly or not,
221. ZIEBER, supra note 219, at 11.
222. Id. at 13.
223. Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 563
(1983). After quoting a passage from Unger, William Ewald says: "As with this passage, so
with Unger's philosophy as a whole: It tries very hard to impress, and it is not impressive."
William Ewald, Unger's Philosophy. A Critical Legal Study, 97 YALE L.J. 665, 756 (1988).
224. See Ellen K. Coughlin, Looking for the Messages in Batman and Donald Duck" Re-
searchers Turn to the Comics, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 5, 1990, at A5, A8.
225. The Andy Warhol craze is a classic example. Warhol "sent out an actor.., to pre-
tend he was Andy Warhol and five colleges... swallowed the bait, paid the fees, and never
knew the difference." BoCKmis, supra note 70, at 223.
226. Who have confronted headlines like "Skadden 4rps Pink Slips 45,4ssociates," NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 7, 1991, at 2.
227. "There had been much talk of change, but little change had occurred." ROBERT STE-
VENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s, at
232 (1983).
228. This refers to a book by Jerry Rubin, a yippie leader of the 1960s who said: "The goal
of the revolution is to eliminate all intellectuals, create a society in which there is no distinction
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they have infiltrated the system.229 They are part of the "new front line
of radical politics." 230 A growing number have graduate degrees in disci-
plines such as English,231 history, and economics2 32 and believe in teach-
ing "[a]lmost [a]nything. ' 23 3 Just like the other parts of the university
milieu,2 34 the common theme is political activism. Garry Wills' "Fat
Demagogue" is now a dean.235
The new activists are a Coalition of three groups: the critical legal
studies people-CLS or "crits, ' '236 feminists, and the "people of color"
movement. Although each has its own agenda, they share the aspiration
of revolutionizing legal education as a preface to revising law.237 Here
enters deconstruction: From a political weapon in the literary battle-
ground, it now emerges as bludgeon for the Coalition's revolution,2 38 es-
between intellectual and physical work: a society without intellectuals." JERRY RUBIN, Do
ITI 213 (1970).
229. "[Y]esterday's student radical is today's tenured professor or academic dean." KIM-
BALL, supra note 111, at xiv.
230. A number of prominent former New Left activists now hold teaching jobs, and
many are carrying on the battles of the protest movement in the contexts of the
academic disciplines. No definitive numbers are available on how many former radi-
cals have become faculty members, but many old New Leftists say-and many con-
servatives complain-that the university has become the new front line of radical
politics.
Michael W. Hirschom, A New-Left Challenger Comes to an Uneasy Peace With Academe,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 29, 1988, at A3.
231. I privilege English over the other disciplines. That is my bias which comes from the
opportunity to talk to William Faulkner in classes at the University of Virginia. For an ac-
count of Faulkner's classroom conferences, see WILLIAM FAULKNER, IN THE UNIVERSITY:
CLASS CONFERENCES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA 1957-1958 (Frederick L. Gwynn et
al. eds., 1965).
232. Posner explains that the "flight from humanities to law by graduate students and
young faculty . .. [started in the 1970s when they] saw jobs and promotion opportunities
drying up and salaries falling steeply in real (that is, inflation-adjusted) terms and decided to
go to law school. . . ." POSNER, supra note 8, at 12 (1988).
233. Charles Rothfeld, What Do Law Schools Teach? Almost Anything, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
23, 1988, at B8.
234. For coverage of what one writer calls the victim's revolution on campus, see DINESH
D'SoUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS 1-23
(1991). See generally CHARLES SYKES, THE HOLLOW MEN: POLICS AND CORRUPTION IN
HIGHER EDUCATION (1990) (discussing the crisis in higher education and focusing on its im-
pact upon Dartmouth College).
235. Garry Wills, The Sixties, ESQUIRE, Oct. 1973, at 135.
236. For the most balanced and thorough treatment of the CLS movement, see ANDREW
ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990).
237. Although a minority, the Coalition nevertheless can be influential. It has become the
main issue at many law schools, dividing faculty and students. See generally Ken Emerson,
When Legal Titans Clash, N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 1990, (Magazine), at 26 (exploring the rift at
Harvard Law School).
238. "Law is conceived to be the instrument of ideology, the ideology of the ruling class,
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pecially for the radical crits.239 "CLS specialists approach the law as a
branch of literature.... They accept as a given, and even revel in, the
indeterminacy of all texts, all writing."' 4
Deconstruction is the intellectual fiber of the radical movement.?
It is like a tattoo to a biker.242 Professors from other disciplines in the
university loop who have been disdainful of legal scholarship24 3 consider
law deconstruction a step toward respectability. On the other hand, the
dwindling group of traditionalists in legal education see deconstruction
as an exercise in cynicism and crass opportunism.24 As we shall see,
they have valid reasons for this concern.
Following accepted practice, the radicals have selected what they
consider the most traditional and privileged description of the legal es-
tablishment to serve as the target of their deconstruction efforts. 24 The
privileged meaning, according to their conventional wisdom, is a system
of patriarchal values, which they identify as neutrality, individualism,
and objectivity. 2' Judges, for example, make impartial decisions based
on neutral laws. Likewise, decision-making and analysis is rational,
and it is the legal scholar's duty to demystify it, exposing rhetoric as sham and putative truths
as spurious." LEHMAN, supra note 27, at 38.
239. ALTMAN, supra note 236, at 19.
240. LEHMAN, supra note 27, at 38.
241. I would exclude the "people of color" movement from the deconstruction group; their
primary concern is their exclusion from the legal academy and a lack of recognition of their
scholarship as "distinctive." See Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia,
102 HARV. L. REv. 1745, 1745-46 (1989).
242. Or ex-marine: "Gary Steuer paid $50,000 for one tattoo-but the brightly colored
illustration covers almost his entire body and it won him the title '1991 World's Best Tattooed
Man'!" Peter Reilly, He's Tattoo Much, NA'L ENQUIRER, Nov. 12, 1991, at 16.
243. For example, publication requirements for law professors generally are strikingly
modest compared to standards applicable to faculty in most other disciplines. Exten-
sive outside activities divert time and energy from research, thereby reducing the
quantity (and perhaps the quality) of legal scholarship. This could reinforce the
opinions of intellectual traditionalists who maintain that law schools do not belong in
universities. Law schools in this view are trade schools whose primary loyalty is to
the bar; their existence on campus undermines the cohesion of the academic commu-
nity and detracts from the central purposes of higher education.
Jonathan L. Entin, The Law Professor as Advocate, 38 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 512, 532 (1988)
(citations omitted).
244. See generally Louis Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36
STAN. L. Rnv. 413, 455 (1984) (describing the Critical Legal Studies movement as "a fountain
of confusion.., simply offering surrealistic pictures for our minds").
245. For self-serving histories of the crit movement, see John H. Schlegel, Notes Toward an
Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36
STAN. L. REv. 391 (1984); Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100
YALE L.J. 1515 (1991).
246. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1685 (1976).
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thereby excluding emotional factors, empathy for the status of a party, or
consideration of irrelevant facts. In other words, everyone is treated as
equal before the law. 47
When this is deconstructed, something totally different appears. To
the crit, the system is a political cover-up: Neutrality and objectivity
exist only to protect wealth and the beneficiaries of a capitalist system.
"[L]egal rules are 'empty vessels' into which individuals can pour virtu-
ally any content they please."24 Moreover, "what passes as legal inter-
pretation can be nothing more than the unconstrained creation of
meaning, based on whatever moral or political conceptions the official
happens to embrace."249
When threatened by "outsiders" such as minorities or women, the
patriarchal judicial system ignores objectivity to favor "its people and
institutions." Ostensibly objective rules in fact favor the perpetuation of
establishment power and white-male bias. The Tyranny of Objectivity250
and neutrality thus serves as a facade to give the appearance of an even
handed system so as to maintain the status quo,25 ' and thereby continue
the marginalization of the oppressed.25 2
The feminist mode of deconstruction is consistent with its adher-
ents' specialized agenda. To them, the real meaning of law is the oppres-
sion of women. For example, the system speaks in terms of protecting
individual rights which, in reality, is meaningless to women because it is
only male rights that are protected.253 Likewise, the system does not
recognize that women speak in a different "voice"--one embodying nur-
ture, empathy, and the ethic of care.254 Deconstruction is used to show
that patriarchal values devalue women.255
247. See David Kairys, Introduction to THE PoLrrIcs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRI-
TIQUE I (D. Kairys ed., 1982).
248. ALTMAN, supra note 236, at 90.
249. Id. at 92.
250. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J.
1373, 1376 (1986).
251. Id. at 1377-78.
252. Ironically, Mark Tushnet considers the term "crit" to be marginalizing. Tushnet,
supra note 245, at 1517 n.10.
253. Robin West says that women are totally excluded from male jurisprudence. Robin
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 58 (1988).
254. The boilerplate reference for this is Carol Gilligan's In A Different Voice. See Joan M.
Shaughnessy, Gilligan's Travels, 7 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 3-5 (1988).
255. "Feminist work has thus named the power of naming and has challenged both the use
of male measures and the assumption that women fail by them." Martha Minow, The
Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 61 (1987).
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IV. Go BACK TO FRANCE-OR-STOP SUBVERTING DERRIDA
Perhaps then, the word 7kTisktt oiI the ow 001. [Y]ou are not theyou that
'meaning'should also be dis- tin ams Sported by Stub7 FMs .... you started with. Time has
carded, since it carries with it Durinar ittrdw Fhk wore a moved on since you opened your
the notion of message or point, bold Shirt sad Ipld ch, a- mouth to speak, the molecules in
The meaning of an utterance ... thouo be ed eq-ualy your body have changed, what you in.
is its experience--ll of it--and that proo of kls dar tan tended .... 2 What is lost... in Fish's
experience is immediately compromised sad assfly brushed ... belief, is the wavering between know.
the moment you say something about ilt. bck Silver hair.- ledge and doubt, power and impotence ....
"Fish applies his ideas systematically, he's soon ready to call the First Amendment 'the first refuge of
scoundrels ....- 260
A. Irrelevant to Law
Other than as a source of amusement, 261 deconstruction has no rele-
vance to law. In the humanities, interpretation is a series of arguments
among academics that never crowns a winner.262 It is fun and games,
"an opportunity for joy, freedom, and play. '263 It is Professor Morris
Zapp enjoying himself on the sexist 26 "call girl circuit. ' 265 "Write a
paper and see the world!"' 266 Ephemera is aporia.267 In law, interpreta-
256. LODGE, supra note 113, at 25 (quoting Morris Zapp).
257. FisH, supra note 114, at 65.
258. D'SouzA, supra note 234, at 173.
259. RAY, supra note 91, at 169.
260. Begley, supra note 112, at 50.
261. A colleague ingenuously deconstructed Buffalo Law Review (the publication) to mean
a review of the law of buffalos (the animal). He then discussed the "law of buffalos." Erik M.
Jensen, A Call for a New Buffalo Law Scholarship, 38 KAN. L. REv. 433, 433-35 (1990).
262. "[Tjhe field of criticism is contentiously constituted by apparently incompatible activi-
ties." CULLER, supra note 34, at 17.
263. Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of
the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 461 (1987).
264. "The phrase 'call girl circuit' in the text, even after reference to the [sic] Mr.
Koestler's title in the footnotes, was offensive to several people in the Law Review office."
Letter from Sybil Kisken, Articles Editor, Arizona Law Review, to Arthur D. Austin (Sept. 22,
1989) (on file with the author) (discussing Arthur D. Austin, The "Custom of Vetting" as a
Substitute for Peer Review, 32 ARiz. L. REv. 1, 6 (1990)).
265. "It becomes a habit, maybe an addiction. You get a long-distance telephone-call from
some professional busybody at some foundation or university--'sincerely hope you can fit it
into your schedule-it will be a privilege to have you with us-return fare economy-class and a
modest honorarium of....' ARTHUR KOESTLER, THE CALL GIRLS 23 (1973) (quoting
Harriet Epsom).
266. LODGE, supra note 113, at 231.
267. The phrase, "Deconstruction is not an ephemera," see supra text accompanying note
9, is Fishbait for decon. The words "deconstruction" and "ephemera" collide. One interpreta-
tion is that deconstruction is not closure, that instead it is a constant process of challenge and
inquiry. Derrida would relate the sentence to other texts to produce a Glas. The obvious-
privileged-interpretation is that it is a negation of deconstruction as a buzzword. This poses
a deMan Archie Bunker contradiction: Archie says "What's the difference? (I don't give a
damn what the difference is.)." deMan says: "The same grammatical pattern engenders two
meanings that are mutually exclusive: [Tlhe literal meaning asks for the concept (difference)
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tion is a serious task that affects the harmony of society. The conse-
quences of deconstructing L'Isle de Gilligan268 are considerably different
from deconstructing the Second Amendment, a statute, or case law.
Legal interpretation is not fun and games. Derridaisms do not work in
the real world.269
The rule of law relies on certainty, stability and predictability.
"Law is a much more pragmatic enterprise than philosophy. '270 Posner
goes to the essence: "[A] statute is better understood not as a literary
work but as a command." 27 Changes occur but only after thorough
analysis and reflection. In contrast, deconstruction defies stability by as-
serting that the reader controls the text and whatever a reader says is
"correct." As a result, all six of the deconstructed interpretations of the
Second Amendment discussed above are "correct," at least for an in-
stant, as part of the Arrow of "trace., 27 2 Only a vain academic would
suggest that the Second Amendment protects the right to a coat of arms
or a backyard nuke and that an eighteen year old is eligible to be a Presi-
dent.273 Likewise, we are in big trouble if there "are as many plausible
readings of the United States Constitution as there are versions of Ham-
let .. .274
For law, there is a more slippery implication: The deconstruction-
ists' "idea is not that there are no right answers, but rather that there can
never be a right answer." '275 Stanley Fish weasels out of this hook by
allowing the judgments of what he calls interpretative communities to
whose existence is denied by the figurative meaning ['I don't give a damn what the difference
is']." PAUL DEMAN, ALLEGORIES OF READING 9 (1979).
268. "The 'island' of the title is a pastoral dystopia, but a dystopia with a difference--or,
rather, a dystopia with a differance (in, of course, the Derridean sense), for this is a dystopia
characterized by the free play of signifier and signified. The key figure of 'Gilligan' exacts a
dialect of absence and presence." Brian Morton, How Not to Write for Dissent, DISSENT, Sum-
mer 1990, at 299.
How about this real-life deconstruction: "A local television station is investigating how
the sound track from a hard-core pornographic movie ended up on a 'Gilligan's Island' epi-
sode." Wire Reports, Porn trackplays during 'Gilligan, 'CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 16, 1992,
at IC.
269. "Many of Derrida's methods are not compelling according to conventional reasoning.
These would include methods such as puns, the red-handed simile, and paradoxes which rea-
son that when an evil is projected from the body to the outside, that proves it is as much 'of'
the inside as the outside." Donald F. Brosnan, Serious But Not Critical, 60 S. CAL. L. REv.
262, 372 (1987) (footnote omitted).
270. J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 754 (1987).
271. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 264 (1990).
272. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
273. D'Amato, supra note 129, at 255.
274. Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 373, 391 (1982).
275. Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 12 (1986).
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prevail.276 In other words, persuade a majority that your reading is the
correct one, and you win. As Fish said: "This is persuasion. It has
nothing to do with truth or knowledge. It is an art .... ,2'" that plays to
crowd psychology: "In crowds the foolish, ignorant, and envious per-
sons are freed from the sense of their insignificance and powerlessness,
and are possessed instead by the notion of brutal and temporary but im-
mense strength., 278 As Judge Posner observes, Professor Fish's concept
is a "sociological generalization" about the process of consensus rather
than a guide to interpretation.279
A crowd psychology approach reduces the rule of law to the level of
a form of media manipulation.280 "The medium is the massage. ' 28 1 It
denigrates the credible critic.28 2 "What we see at work throughout is a
deliberate attempt to supplant reason by rhetoric, truth by persuasion,
using the simple device of denying that there is any essential distinction
to be made between them. '2 3 It is interesting to note that M.H. Abrams
accuses Fish of ignoring his own theory by making interpretations that
"never entirely depart from implicit reliance on the old way of reading
texts. ' 284 Thus, when push comes to shove, Fish is like practicing law-
yers who make a living predicting determinacy. 2 5
Textuality teaches that the reader creates meaning and that mean-
ings are infinite, changing within minutes-even seconds-as the envi-
ronment and perceptions change. Words keep deferring-"tracing"-to
276. FISH, supra note 114, at Ch. 15. For a short history of interpretive communities, see
POSNER, supra note 271, at 436 n.17.
277. D'SouzA, supra note 234, at 174.
278. GUSTAVE LE BON, THE CROWD 50-51 (Compass ed., The Viking Press 1960) (1875).
279. POSNER, supra note 271, at 450.
280. Including the swamp of "subliminal seduction." See WILSON B. KEY, SUBLIMINAL
SEDUCTION (1973).
281. "All media work us over completely. They are so pervasive in their personal, polit-
ical, economic, aesthetic, psychological, moral, ethical, and social consequences that they leave
no part of us untouched, unaffected, unaltered. The medium is the massage." MARSHALL
McLuHAN ET AL., THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE 26 (1967).
282. "Great critics have fortunately eluded 'interpretative communities,' resisted or contra-
dicted them. Fish's theories encourage the view that there are no wrong interpretations, that
there is no norm implied in a text, and hence that there is no knowledge of an object." Wellek,
supra note 25, at 5.
283. KIMBALL, supra note 111, at 164.
284. M.H. Abrams, How To Do Things with Texts, 46 PARTISAN REv. 566, 580 (1979).
285. The deconstructionist theory ... fails to realize that most adjudication is simply
a matter of housekeeping. To suggest that legal doctrine does not control in these
instances is to suggest that the white line does not keep drivers on the right side of
the road, even when they have no desire to drive on the left.
Kenny Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1213 (1985). For a
discussion of the determinacy of certain legal questions, see Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can
Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. Rnv. 1 (1990).
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the future and referring to the past. As Gertrude Stein said of the city of
Oakland: "There's no there there. ' 286 Or, as the elusive "laureate of
absence," Henri Mensonge said: "[T]here is no about about for any
thinking to be about.128 7 This is the black hole for the law deconstruc-
tionist: Any interpretation a crit offers is in turn subject to deconstruc-
tion, then that interpretation is fed back into the text for even more
interpretation,28 8 and so on.28 9 The deconstruction "argument means
nothing and establishes nothing., 290  "It can displace a hierarchy mo-
mentarily, it can shed light on otherwise hidden dependences of concepts,
but it cannot propose new hierarchies of thought or substitute new foun-
dations.129 1 Other than to create a self-serving interpretative commu-
nity292 or falling to fatigue,293 there is only one way to evade this black
void; stop performance of deconstruction and announce that "emancipa-
286. LEHMAN, supra note 27, at 98. Stein also told Ernest Hemingway: "Remarks are not
literature." Daniel Stern, The Trouble With Schlifkin, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, at 10 (re-
viewing JOSEPH EPsTEIN, THE GOLDIN Boys (1991) (quoting Gertrude Stein)).
287. MALCOLM BRADBURY, MY STRANGE QUES FOR MENSONGE 63 (1987).
288. "Deconstructive readings may thus refuse to make aesthetic richness an end. When-
ever one comes to what might seem a stopping point-a nice paradox or symmetrical formula-
tion-one feeds this position back into the text, asking what the work has to say about the
conclusion reached." CULLER, supra note 34, at 240.
289. Any attempt to offer its own vision of a reconstituted society would merely result
in the replacement of one form of consciousness with another; "liberal conscious-
ness" would simply be exchanged for "Critical consciousness". The CLS vision
would be equally illegitimate and would amount to just another form of domination.
The implication of this insight for the Critical scholars seems to be that each individ-
ual must be left to act alone, free from the constraints of any inhibiting
consciousness.
Allan C. Hutchinson et al., Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding
Drama ofAmerican Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 199, 229 (1984).
290. ALTMAN, supra note 236, at 93.
291. J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.". 743, 786 (1987).
However, as it is a method designed to erode a system of meaning omnivorously and
without regard to the ideological content of the system (presumably any system con-
taining values expressed in language is equally vulnerable), it is clearly not a method
for building a radical negative critique that implies a systematic reconstruction
grounded on a different social theory oi moral vision. What is more, the validation
of a technique that may easily chew up any radical alternative probably inhibits the
development of one.
Brosnan, supra note 269, at 375-76.
292. "Why stop the deconstruction here? ... The answer is that the relatively autono-
mous self is more than happy to stop the deconstructive ride and the interpretive community
thesis is a better place to get off than most." Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the
Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. L.J. 37, 47 (1987).
293. "If deconstructive criticism is a pursuit of differences-differences whose suppression
is the condition of any particular entity or position-then it can never reach final conclusions
but stops when it can no longer identify and dismantle the differences that work to dismantle
other differences." CULLER, supra note 34, at 242.
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tion and enlightenment" have been achieved.294 This is the accepted-
but obviously spurious-practice of crit deconstructionists; they stop
when they have flushed out what they deem to be the correct view.295
"[T]hough postmodernist Marxists babble about indeterminacy of mean-
ig, they do not wish to leave the meaning of what they consider central
in an indeterminate state. '29 6 Then they self-destruct. "At the moment
the choice is made, the critical theorist is, strictly speaking, no longer a
deconstructionist. ' '297
B. Suspect Motivation
The motivation of deconstruction flushes out another reason for its
incompatibility with law. Deconstruction is an academic game-a polit-
ical attack; its practitioners cite "Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare. '298
The political emphasis is the legacy of the French connection,299 where
the appeal of deconstruction was its effectiveness in undermining "a sin-
gle authoritative traditional opinion on literary texts. ' ' 3co It is thus not
surprising that one of the radical's "central goals" is "the dejustification
of legal rules., 30 1 The law radicals call this "trashing. '30 2 "Take specific
294. Balkin, supra note 291, at 765.
295. Id at 764-66.
Not only does a deconstructionist begin deconstructing for a reason, she also ends
her deconstruction for a reason. The reason may be complex or simple. She may
stop because she has demonstrated to her own satisfaction that Justice Scalia's opin-
ion is incoherent, or that apartheid is evil, or because she realizes that she is beating a
dead horse by looking at the back of cereal boxes. She may cease deconstructing
because her editor told her that the article had to be twenty-thousand words and no
more, or because she has run out of bond paper, or even because she is in a hurry and
needs to get to the grocery store before it closes. In theory, however, one could go
on. One could go on forever. In fact, of course, we always do stop. We decide, at
some point, that there is nothing mor6 to be decided about this undecidable text. If
we always have an ax to grind when deconstructing, at some point we do find it
necessary to bury the hatchet.
J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REv.
1613, 1627-28 (1990).
296. HIRSCH, supra note 96, at 171.
297. Balkin, supra note 291, at 766.
298. David Fraser, If IHad a Rocket Launcher: Critical Legal Studies as Moral Terrorism,
41 HASINGS L.J. 777, 782, 785 (1990) (citing Guyora Binder, On Critical Legal Studies as
Guerrilla Warfare, 76 GEO. L.J. 1, 1-14 (1987)).
299. "Derrida made it plain that his intent was to baffle and provoke, rather than reach any
common ground of discussion." NORRIS, supra note 53, at 108.
300. ELLIS, supra note 27, at 84. "The French deconstructionists were dedicated to un-
masking this bourgeois imposture by means of their own countertheory of the indeterminacy
of language and meaning, and in that sense they considered themselves to be embarked on a
politically revolutionary undertaking." Shaw, supra note 99, at 52.
301. Schlegel, supra note 245, at 407.
302. "The slogan of the student rebels of the 1960s--'Trash the glass of ruling class'-
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arguments very seriously in their own terms; discover they are actually
foolish ([tragi]-comic); and then look for some (external observer's) order
(not the germ of truth) in the internally contradictory, incoherent chaos
we've exposed."30 3 In other words, if something is running smoothly,
trash it with anti-intellectual and non-analytical arguments.3" Reduce
everything-especially thought-to the lowest common denominator of
equalitarianism. 05 It's fun.30 6 To Alice B. Toklas, trashing30 7 is trash-
ing308 is trashing" and "as an expression of the spirit of legal ico-
noclasm, is nothing new."310
Critics say that law deconstruction delivers a nihilistic message.311
"[I]t insists not that everything has been said but that nothing can be
said-that words have reached their tautological ends. 31 2 This is a valid
criticism; 3 13 its primary message is critical terrorism without positive
remedy. "Each interpreter seems especially skilled in criticizing others;
reemerges in the critique of law .... " Giinter Frankenberg, Down By Law: Irony, Seriousness,
and Reason, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 360, 389 (1989).
303. Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 293 (1984). See Alan D. Free-
man, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229 (1981) (presenting a
general defense of the values of trashing).
304. "It is true that our utopian 'work' has been strictly anti or nonintellectual." Kelman,
supra note 303, at 335-36.
305. "[D]ebunking is one part of an explicit effort to level, to reintegrate the communities
we live in along explicitly egalitarian lines rather than along the rationalized hierarchical lines
that currently integrate them." Id. at 326.
306. "Why defend [trashing]? For one thing, trashing is fun. I love trashing." Freeman,
supra note 303, at 1230.
307. One could be talking about the use of "pipes, steel plates, water heaters, radiators,
windshield wipers, car bumpers-all the trash that society throws away" to create abstract art.
Joe Mullins, Artist Turns Trash into Sculptures Worth $30,000, NAT'L ENQUIRER, Oct. 29,
1991, at 20.
308. It could refer to "trashing" outer space with debris. Trashing Space, Sci. AM., Aug.
1987, at 14. Or, it could refer to the "Trash Police." Elizabeth Fischer, The Trash Police,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1991, at A35.
309. The crits would no doubt be piqued to learn that trash is slang for "Money ca. 1590-
1830 .... As the O.E.D. remarks, Shakespeare's 'who steals my purse, steals trash' was
prob[ably] an operative factor." ERIC PARTRIDGE, A DICTIONARY OF SLANG AND UNCON-
VENTIONAL ENGLISH 907 (5th ed. 1961). There is another definition they would like: "The
young call looting [from shops] 'trashing', and the word suggests what is happening. The
status of goods changes from something with a price to trash." ERIC PARTRIDGE, A CONCISE
DICTIONARY OF SLANG AND UNCONVENTIONAL ENGLISH 473 (Paul Beale ed., 1989).
310. A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Iconoclasts and Legal Ideals, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 819, 824
(1990).
311. Id. Delivered in their disingenuous vocabulary. Schwartz, supra note 244, at 440-44.
312. LEHMAN, supra note 27, at 41.
313. The same criticism applies to literary deconstruction. "What is at issue is not nihilism
itself, but the insincerity of the nihilism expressed here, which is that of a clever child who has
learned to play with words.... It is, once again, a nihilism in bad faith." HIRSCH, supra note
96, at 78.
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the moves by which one undermines (or deconstructs) one's opponents
are increasingly well known." '3 14 It also spreads more mischief. Many
young faculty are already disdainful of law as a profession. 315 They came
to teaching to get away from practice.316 As a Harvard Law student
mused: "Always keep in mind that most professors have had less experi-
ence practicing law than the average 3L.' 3 17 Deconstruction and trash-
ing exacerbate this bias by encouraging faculty to attack, for "fun" and
fashion, the establishment, its ideals, and traditions. 18 Practitioners,
without knowing it, are the "privileged" enemy.31 9 In the process, law
faculty seek dialogue with more congenial friends in the university loop
and, as a federal judge complained, law academics "are writing for each
other. ' 3 0  A former dean of Yale Law School complains that "law
professors today are more concerned with intellectual currents among
their colleagues in the arts and sciences and less concerned about law
practice and the output of the bench." '321
C. Subverts Scholarship
Narcissism and power politics are having a subtle but decisive effect
on legal scholarship. Just when the quality of work was improving-
especially with first rate interdisciplinary writing-deconstruction ap-
pears to seduce young people into the black hole of trashing. Unfledged
writers do not understand that deconstruction is "performance," rather
than analysis and scholarship. "Deconstruction is first and last a textual
activity .... "322 It is not, for example, a work of scholarship to assume
314. Sanford Levinson, On Dworkin, Kennedy, and Ely: Decoding The Legal Past, 51 PAR-
TISAN Rnv. 248, 263 (1984).
315. "Very few of the CLS academics engage in any traditional lawyering tasks, whether
reform-oriented litigation, preparation of legislative statutes, or the like." Sanford Levinson,
On Critical Legal Studies, DISSENT, Summer 1989, at 360, 364.
316. "Law school teaching increasingly recruits those 'who for one reason or another are
not happy in practice, adapted to practice or interested in practice.'" Martha Middleton,
Legal Scholarship: Is It Irrelevant?, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 9., 1989, at 1, 8 (quoting Judge Richard
A. Posner).
317. Alysse MacIntyre, You Mean You Really Wanted to Come to HLS?, HARv. L. REC.,
Sept. 13, 1991, at 8.
318. Shaw says that deconstruction created a "vacuum." Into the vacuum thus created
moved the minions of the politically correct, ready, precisely on the deconstructionist model of
vilification, to 'unmask' and anathematize any who resisted the new regime as racist,
homophobic, anti-female, Eurocentrist." Shaw, supra note 99, at 53.
319. Duncan Kennedy suggests law firm "trashing." See infra note 363.
320. Judith S. Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 313, 320 (1989).
321. John C. Metaxas, Two Justices, Self-Congratulation Mark Harvard Anniversary Bash,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 22, 1986, at 4 (quoting Dean Wellington).
322. CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, THE DECONSTRUCTIVE TURN: ESSAYS IN THE RHETORIC
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polar positions as a preface for polemic. Moreover, "this rush from one
end of the spectrum to the other inevitably leaps over and avoids previ-
ous thought on these issues, thought that had frequently explored what
lies between the two ends of the spectrum with considerable subtlety." '323
It is even more disturbing to see the growing tendency of people using
deconstruction as a rationalization for punk legal lit.324 Impressionable
writers seriously deconstruct the case of the letters "c" and "f" in crit325
and feminism.326 It is like making a career of following the Grateful
Dead. 27
Because it is anti-establishment, a growing number of young profes-
sors affect decon without knowing what it is. Like that great brain sur-
geon, Jethro Boudin of the Beverly Hillbillies, they play the role of
"lawyer as astrophysicist. '3 2 They become instant "experts" on people
like Wittgenstein, 29 Bloom,33 ° and Derrida. Decon is difficult to under-
stand and thus "safe." Derrida is purposely vague and the people who
write about him and the topic add layers of confusion to the subject. It
is, as noted, a field that specializes in mystery.33' It was Stanley Fish
who purportedly summed up the decon state of mind by saying that
decon "'relieves me of the obligation to be right.., and demands only
OF PHILOSOPHY 6 (1983). As a result, "it is neither possible nor desirable to state a decon-
structionist creed." Balkin, supra note 291, at 746.
323. ELLIS, supra note 27, at 141.
324. See, eg., Guyora Binder, On Critical Legal Studies as Guerrilla Warfare, 76 GEo. L.J.
1 (1987); Fraser, supra note 298.
325. "I find the term 'crits' marginalizing and when used by adherents of critical legal
studies almost an internalization of that marginalization." Tushnet, supra note 245, at 1517
n.10.
326. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Ed-
ucation or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 61 n.1 (1988); see also
Mary Dunlap, The "F" Word: Mainstreaming and Marginalizing Feminism, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J 251, 251-52 (1989) (arguing that the negative connotations associated with the
word "feminist" are a result of society's refusal to accept the feminist commitment to empower
women).
327. Who, despite an anti-materialistic image, were the top touring act of 1991, grossing
$35,243,237. Top 10 Touring Concert Acts of 1991, AMUSEMENT Bus., Dec. 25, 1991.
328. Mark V. Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public
Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1307, 1338 n.140 (1979).
329. How can anyone understand a man who gave away the family fortune? "So," [the
notary said,] "you want to commit financial suicide!" RAY MONK, LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN:
THE DuTY OF GENIUS 171 (1990).
330. Reference to "Bloom" is instant aporia; to which Bloom am I referring? Harold, of
Yale, Allan, of The Closing of the American Mind fame, or James Joyce's Leopold Bloom?
331. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. As a colleague of Morris Zapp complained:
"There was a time when reading was a comparatively simple matter, something you learned to
do in primary school. Now it seems to be some kind of arcane mystery, into which only a
small elite have been initiated." LODGE, supra note 113, at 27.
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that I be interesting.' ,,332
The consequence is immature scholarship-a hodge-podge of trash-
ing, polemic, and shallow value judgments. "Weird" case scenarios are
concocted for verbal gamesmanship.333 On occasion, trashing turns to
insult.334 Writers use the word to be part of the fashion.335 Members of
the new chic use the world to rationalize simple (and simplistic) disagree-
ment.336 Moreover, each writer seemingly uses a private form of decon
with private rules unknown to the reader. As one writer warns: "I am
not using 'deconstruction' in the technical sense used by critical legal
scholars influenced by Jacque Derrida... but in the emerging popular
sense of deconstructing a social phenomenon into its component
parts. ' 337 Say what?338 The cumulative effect has been a devaluation of
legal publications and emphasis on gamesmanship with student editors
who lack the background to understand what is happening.339 It is
hubris to publish self-parodies like Roll Over Beethoven.3 4°
D. Where Are the Solutions?
In developing its unique accommodation to other forms of literary
decon, crits and others identify a politically charged privileged meaning
which flushes out the existence of an opposite polar interpretation, creat-
ing indeterminacy and an open season for "correct" meanings. There
are, however, two serious defects in this process.
First, deconstructionists typically assume a simplistic version of a
332. LEHMAN, supra note 27, at 75 (quoting Stanley Fish).
333. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 420 (1985).
334. "Under the circumstances, I take some pleasure, not however unmixed with regret, in
noting that the Framers would have understood the phenomenon that Professor Tribe's work
represents: [T]hey called it corruption." Mark Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694,
710 (1980) (reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978)).
335. Alex M. Johnson, The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007, 2050 (1991).
336. See, eg., Robin West, Deconstructing the CLS-Fem Split, 2 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 85
(1986).
337. Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 797 n.1 (1989).
338. The "what" comes from someone who says that "my attack on 'authorship' aspires to
'deconstruct."' Then says "[m]y objectives may be less than completely true to the aims of
deconstruction. My emphasis on the role of ideology in the story of 'authorship' suggests
general 'post-structuralist,' rather than specifically deconstructionist tendencies .... ." Peter
Jaszi, Toward A Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "A uthorship," 1991 DUKE LJ.
455, 456-57.
339. See Arthur Austin, Commentary on Jensen's Commentary on Commentary, 24 CONN.
L. R v. 175 (1991). Biting the bullet, the faculty at George Mason University is converting its
law review into a faculty-edited journal. Ken Myers, Law Review Editing: Profs Enter Where
Students Used to Tread, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 14, 1991, at 4.
340. Peter Gabel et al., Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1983-84).
[V!ol. 71
DECONSTR UCTION
privileged meaning. 341 Although this is an accepted sleight-of-hand tac-
tic in academic gamesmanship, it is a fatal flaw in law. It is true that
general principles guide law; nevertheless the reality is that our legal sys-
tem is a mixture of values, of visions, of rules and discretion, and of
positive law and natural law. 34 2 Hence, the assumption of an exclusive
privileged meaning does not hold up.34 3 Moreover, the privileged mean-
ing is unenviably a carefully constructed paradigm to fit the decon-
structor's bias.3" As Professor Schwartz says: "The most common, and
most disingenuous, misrepresentation in CLS writing is the false attribu-
tion to ideological opponents of a ridiculous position that can then serve
as a straw man to be demolished.
345
Second, after an attack, deconstruction stops; it's all over for the
deconstuctionist. 346 The system is evil and should be replaced by a new
vision. Respectable analysis does not cease at this point. It is at this
point that the analyst-or lawyer-is obligated to show why the tradi-
tional view is wrong and why the new view is legitimate and worthy of
replacing the old interpretation.347 The reason the law deconstruction-
ists avoid analysis is to go immediately to trashing. They practice the
"art of erosion. ' 348 "Positive proposals from the CLS movement never
go far beyond a general endorsement of equality, participatory democ-
racy, and (sometimes) socialism. 349
Duncan Kennedy, revered among the crits as "a cross between Ras-
putin and Billy Graham,, 350 supplies a classic example of "platitudi-
nous' 31 writing. He is a political writer who poses as a jurisprudent.
Kennedy is best known for combining legal deconstruction with a theory
341. Ellis says that the reason for adopting a narrow and authoritative privileged interpre-
tation is that it rationalizes the deconstruction. "To say that a text has one meaning sounds
inherently very restrictive; that makes the leap to 'no limit on meanings'-the typical leap to
an opposite extreme-more plausible." ELLIS, supra note 27, at 125.
342. See POSNER, supra note 271, at 405.
343. It does not, moreover, hold up in literature either. ELLIS, supra note 27, at 125.
344. "CLS not only too easily assumes that everyone in a society reflects the same hege-
monic vision, but also too gullibly-or too arrogantly-tends to interpret the language of
others literally and to treat all expressions as sincere reflections of basic beliefs." Stephen
Diamond, Not-So-Critical Legal Studies, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 693, 707 (1985).
345. Schwartz, supra note 244, at 446. "[W]e must try to present the most subtle and
sympathetic interpretations of an opponent's viewpoints before we uncharitably 'trash' them."
Cornell West, CLS and a Liberal Critic, 97 YALE L.J. 757, 759 (1988).
346. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
347. ELLIS, supra note 27, at 71.
348. Todd Gitlin, Postmoderism: Roots and Politics, DIsSENT, Winter 1989, at 101, 108.
349. Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want To Be a Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 247,
282 (1984).
350. Schlegel, supra note 245, at 392.
351. Johnson, supra note 349, at 283.
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of contradiction to produce two competing visions: altruism and individ-
ualism. "Altruism enjoins us to make sacrifices, to share, and to be
merciful. It has roots in culture, in religion, ethics and art, that are as
deep as those of individualism. (Love thy neighbor as thyself.)." '352 Indi-
vidualism on the other hand, says, "I am entitled to enjoy the benefits of
my efforts without an obligation to share or sacrifice them to the interests
of others." '353
This is obviously an elevated and abstract set of visions--equal to
the 1960s cult of Consciousness III engineered by Charles Reich.35 4 But
Kennedy exacerbates the problem by constantly waffling in acknowledg-
ing the mushiness of his visions: He confesses that it is impossible to
"prove" or "disprove"35 the validity of either vision.356 It is, however,
his "deconstruction to indeterminacy" that best dramatizes the irrele-
vance of deconstruction to law.
Kennedy does not accept the existence of an underlying structure of
fixed principles with a margin of exceptions. "What distinguishes the
modem situation is the breakdown of the conceptual boundary between
the core and the periphery, so that all the conflicting positions [altruism
and individualism] are at least potentially relevant to all issues. 35 7 The
result is every case or legal conflict "will raise the fundamental conflict of
individualism and altruism. 358 Under these conditions, in which every
case could involve an effort to impose either an altruism or individualism
structure, conflicts resolution would be virtually impossible. Altman
says: "Indeed, the typical experience that lawyers and judges have of the
law, quite the opposite of these radical claims, is that law does have an
objective structure and that one must know that structure in order to
practice law competently." '359
While Kennedy writes political essays, others preach love-read
Professor Singer: "The goal of politics and law should be to organize
352. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1685, 1717 (1976).
353. Id at 1713.
354. In 1970, Yale Professor Charles Reich published The Greening of America, an anti.
establishment manifesto which became an instant success. "So everybody knows by now that
Greening is an Important Book, the In thing to read this season, the one to wave around if
you're hip." David Brudnoy, One, Two, Many Consciousnesses III, 22 NAT'L REV. 1354, 1354
(1970).
355. Kennedy, supra note 352, at 1722-23.
356. He sums up by admitting that "[a]s with Romanticism, we can believe in the useful-
ness of the notion of altruism without being able to demonstrate its existence experimentally,
or show the inevitability of the association of the elements that compose it." Id. at 1723.
357. Id. at 1737.
358. Id. at 1766.
359. ALTMAN, supra note 236, at 139.
242 [Vol. 71
1992] DECONSTR UCTION
social life in a way that will maximize the number and variety of social
situations in which contact among people is experienced as mutually self-
validating and loving rather than mutually isolating and threatening."36°
Then, as Professor James Gordon observes, after an exercise in shoveling
smoke, Kennedy, Singer, and friends "zoom off in their BlMWs and Jag-
uars to continue their class struggle against hierarchy and privilege."
361
E. Big Losers: Students
The ultimate negative effect is on students as deconstruction is now
de rigueur in many classrooms. 362 It is not taught as a process of inter-
pretation or as a crossover from literary criticism but as a means of sub-
verting the "establishment." 363 Students are told that rational analysis is
politically wrong, that objectivity is oppressive, and that a neutral system
hides evil subjectivity. Under intellectual populism, everyone's judgment
is equal. 364 The TV program L.A. Law is assigned for discussion and
360. Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards. Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE
L.J. 1, 70 (1984).
361. James D. Gordon III, Law Review and the Modern Mind, 33 ARIz. L. REv. 265, 269
(1991).
362. Professor Fiss says that the CLS movement-the prime support of deconstruction-
"has not peaked and continues to hold its sway within the academy." Owen M. Fiss, The Law
Regained, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 246 (1989). He adds that "students everywhere feel a
special affinity to critical legal studies." Id.
363. Decon Duncan Kennedy advises young law firm associates not to laugh at jokes and
throw "[b]lank expressions where the oppressor expects a compliant smile." Duncan Ken-
nedy, Rebels From Principle: Changing the Corporate Law Firm From Within, HARV. L. SCH.
BULL., Fall 1981, at 36, 39.
The strategy I am proposing involves fighting with your elders and betters-sassing
them, maybe; undermining them, maybe; hurting their feelings, certaily ....
... If you think before you act, if you are subtle, collusive, skillful and tricky, if
you use confrontation when confrontation will work, you should be able to do left
office politics without being fired, and make partner.
Id. at 40.
For the reaction to Kennedy's article, see Responses, HARV. L. SCH. BULL., Spring 1982,
at 30, 30.
Kennedy gets as much-or more-than he gives. In reply to his suggestion that law
professors periodically change place with law school custodial staff, a janitor said:
We can't even get them to empty their own trash! I'd settle for that rather than some
highfalutin, job swapping idea that this guy knows this would never happen in a
million years. Maybe he can sell that line to a bunch of fruitcake students, but he
can't fool us janitors.
Brian Timmons, That's No Okie, That's My Tort Professor, WALL ST. J., April 3, 1990, at A24.
364. "For me education is not, and cannot be, an interchange between equals. If every
person's opinion is valued equally, regardless of ability or training or experience, education is
simply not taking place." G. Edward White, The Text, Interpretation, and Critical Standards,
60 TEX. L. R1v. 569, 586 (1982).
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taken seriously. 65 Students assume, as members of the fun genera-
tion,366 that "anything goes," '367 and it does. Carried to its logical con-
clusion, decon rationalizes plagiarism: Once on paper, the writer loses
property interest in the text to the reader.36 As the former Dean of
Duke Law School observed, deconstruction advocates are more likely to
train crooks than teach lawyers.369 It misleads the gullible; why else
would a student write on the last page of his exam: "I have decon-
structed this exam and the grade is A+." My reply: "According to my
deconstruction, you get a C+. My deconstruction counts, yours does
not." See J. DERRIDA.
365. Stephen Gillers, Taking L. Law More Seriously, 98 YALE L.J. 1607, 1607 (1989).
366. Law school is a shopping mall where entertainers like Stevie Wonder counter student
boredom with singing lectures. "The importance of getting people's attention and then using
that attention to make a better world was stressed in a rare lecture delivered ... by Steveland
Morris, better known to the world as musical genius Stevie Wonder." Gregory Klima, Won-
derSpeaks, Sings, HARv. L. REc., Apr. 27, 1984, at 1, 1. Law school is "above all-fun." At
Harvard, Where Studying Law Is Fun, HARV. L. SCH. BULL., Summer 1988, at 28, 28 (quoting
Harvard law student).
367. "The 'fundamental contradiction' deconstructed every normative structure, be it legal
or political, and allowed nothing to remain in its wake besides interest and preference." Fiss,
supra note 362, at 247.
368. LEHMAN, supra note 27, at 59. There is, under this logic, a positive side: Footnotes
would become obsolete. See generally Arthur D. Austin, Footnotes as Product Differentiation,
40 VAND. L. REv. 1131 (1987) (describing the evolution and various techniques of article
differentiation and its impact on the author's career).
369. Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUc. 222, 227 (1984). For
the reaction, see Peter W. Martin, "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic
Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1 (1985).
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"Deconstruction is dubious philosophy and still more dubious social action."" I try to put myself" 'at a point so that I do not
know any longer where I am going:""' "BY GIVING CREDENCE TO THE IDEA THAT
WORDS ARE INADEQUATE TO EXPRESS CONCEPTS, PACIFIC GAS
UNDERMINES THE BASIC PRINCIPLE THAT Rumors that deconstructive
LANGUAGE PROVIDES A MEANINGFUL CONSTRAINT criticism denigrates literature,
celebrates the free associationON PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONDUCT."' '  [I can't of readers, and eliminates
understand what the young are saying. They can't speak properly.]373 meaning and referentially,
An "important tendency in contemporary critical theory-the tendency to conclude seem comically aberrant when
that one speck ruins the whole fruit, that a blurry distinction must be a false one examines a few of the
distinction."" many examples ofdeconstractive criticism."'
370. Cox, supra note 67, at 67.
371. LENTRICCHIA, supra note 27, at 174 (quoting Jacques Derrida, Structure, Sign, and
Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in THE STRUCTURALIST CONTROVERSY: THE
LANGUAGES OF C~rricisM AND THE SCIENCES OF MAN 247, 267 (Richard Macksey et al.
eds., 1972).
372. Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988).
373. A Thousand Words Before Breakfast (Interview with Anthony Burgess), THE ECONO-
MIST, Oct. 19, 1991, at 105, 106.
374. Menand, supra note 106, at 40.
375. CULLER, supra note 34, at 280.

